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FISHING BOATS INCREASINGLY CONVERT FROM DIESEL TO HEAVY OIL

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 5 Dec 80 p 3

[Text] All in all 55 beam-trawlers, 3 seiners and about 10 freighters use heavy oil. Estimates are that savings from heavy oil consumption will amount to about 5 billion kronur this year. On the other hand, changes are in store as prices of heavy oil have skyrocketed in Rotterdam recently. Furthermore, a special agreement on heavy oil with the Soviet Union calls for a \$15 per ton price increase. Kristjan Ragnarsson, the director of LIU [National Alliance of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners], estimates that price increases on markets have entailed 3.1 billion kronur in additional expenditures for the fishing industry.

Kristinn Halldorsson, from LIU's Technological Department, said yesterday that he estimated that a beam-trawler of the smaller size would have burned 182 million kronur worth of oil this year if it had switched to heavy oil. If, however, the ship's engines were made to run on gas oil only, estimates are that it would have used 252 million kronur worth of oil during the year. Thus, about 70 million kronur were saved for each of the smaller beam-trawlers, and even more for the bigger ones.

When Halldorsson was asked how much additional cost the use of heavy oil entailed, he said that it had not been investigated in this country. Estimates were 0-15 percent additional cost because of the wear-and-tear on the engines and additional upkeep. However, the use of the oil depended on the type of engine. He mentioned that two of the ones that had started to use heavy oil had discontinued its use but are planning to start burning it again. Others had continued to use the oil, which indicated that people considered it economical.

Halldorsson said that the trawler Narfi had been switched over to heavy oil in 1968, but had difficulties burning it to begin with. In 1974 the Japanese trawlers were changed over, and in 1978 and 1979 people really took action and switched most of the trawler fleet over to heavy oil.

Halldorsson said that he estimated it would cost 30-35 million kronur to change the ships over and that the most expensive items were additional separators, heaters, pipes and fuel tanks. Most of the ships have been changed over in the country, and two task forces connected with LIU worked on many of them.

8743

CSO: 3111

SOVIET REFUSAL TO SELL MORE HEAVY OIL HURTS FISHERMEN

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 4 Dec 80 p 3

[Text] Estimates are that Iceland needs 170,000 tons of heavy oil next year. Most of the heavy oil used in the country is bought from the Soviet Union. Now the Soviets have refused to sell Iceland more than 110,000 tons, and there are no prospects for purchasing heavy oil elsewhere. Over 50 beam-trawlers and 3 capelin ships consume heavy oil. Capelin factories and other factories use this type of oil as well.

This information was included in the speech by Kristjan Ragnarsson, the director of LIU [National Alliance of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners], as he opened the main conference of the alliance yesterday. He said that in recent years Iceland bought high quality oil from the Soviet Union and that an additional \$2 a ton had been paid for it in line with the Rotterdam price schedule for very heavy oil. Under a recent agreement with the Soviet Union the quality oil will cost an extra \$17, instead of \$2, as before.

The price increase is in addition to a major price rise for heavy oil, as heavy oil prices have skyrocketed on the Rotterdam market, from \$187 in September to \$242 as of today.

Kristjan Ragnarsson said furthermore: "Increased expenditures for this reason amount to about 60 million kronur for each small trawler and 75 million kronur for each larger trawler per year. The additional expenditures total 3.135 billion kronur, regardless of fluctuations in the exchange rate. This is merely a foreign price increase. These changes cause increased industry deficits amounting to 3.5 percent of its income, and in order to offset the impact, local oil prices would have to increase 3.5 percent. The price difference between gas oil and heavy oil will, therefore, decrease considerably and curtail the savings that consumption of heavy oil has entailed."

8743

CSO: 3111

BRIEFS

HEAVY OIL PRICE INCREASE--The Pricing Committee agreed last Wednesday to allow a 30 percent price increase for heavy oil; thus, a ton would cost 166,000 kronur after the increase. The boost will not be implemented until the government gives the green light. The price of a ton of heavy oil on the Rotterdam market is \$270 right now, but after the domestic increase a ton will go for about \$280. Developments in heavy oil have been unfavorable over the last couple of months, and now the question is whether it is more economical to continue to run ships on heavy oil or gas oil. Many ships in the Icelandic fleet have been changed over to use heavy oil instead of gas oil. During a conference of the Icelandic Management Association yesterday aimed at forecasting economic developments next year, the director of the Statistics Bureau said that it would be less economical for the ships to use heavy oil already next year, if price developments in heavy oil and gas oil are the same. A ton of gas oil now sells on the Rotterdam market for about \$330. In comparing the use of heavy oil and gas oil, we must take into account that engines that burn heavy oil require more maintenance. [Text] [Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 5 Dec 80 p 37] 8743

CSO: 3111

SYRIAN PUBLISHER WOUNDED IN BOMB EXPLOSION

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 9-15 Jan 81 p 2

[Text]

Hani al Hindy, the Syrian writer and publisher who was seriously wounded in a booby-trap bomb explosion in Limassol last week, may have been hit in retaliation for the bombing of a Jewish-owned hotel in Nairobi on New Year's Eve that killed 15 people and wounded 85.

Police sources said this was one of the possibilities being investigated in connection with the detention of a mysterious foreigner formally identified as Michael Antoine Pivin, a Canadian passport holder, who was arrested for loitering suspiciously outside Hindy's home a few hours before the explosion.

The police have declined to comment on reports in the local press quoting police sources as saying Pivin is an Israeli agent.

The link between the Limassol and Nairobi explosions is provided by a statement made by the Kenyan government on Wednesday blaming the bombing of the Nairobi hotel on Qaddura Mohammad Abdel Hamid, a Moroccan citizen and member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

Hindy, 52, is a former member of the Syrian Parliament who according to friends was one of the founder members of the PFLP together with its leader, Dr George Habash, though they added that he has not been actively engaged in politics for many years.

The theory linking the two explosions is that Israel's secret services moved swiftly to avenge the PFLP attack on the Nairobi hotel by striking at Hindy, as one of the Palestinian group's founders.

The PFLP office in Beirut denied the Kenyan govern-

ment charge that it was responsible for the Nairobi explosion.

Five years ago Kenya turned over to Israel three Palestinians and two West Germans who were convicted of trying to shoot down an Israeli El Al jetliner near Nairobi Airport. All five radicals were members of the PFLP. Israel released the two Germans last month, who returned to West Germany.

Hindy has been living in Limassol for nearly three years, though he worked in Beirut where he runs the prestigious Institute for Arab Research.

Last Sunday Hindy, who lost his left arm in the explosion, was evacuated to Beirut on a special Middle East Airlines flight.

Pivin is to appear before a Limassol court again today when the original 8-day remand order against him expires.

HOUSE PRESIDENT CALLS FOR UNITED ECONOMY

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 18 Dec 80 p 1

[Text]

ACTING PRESIDENT ALEKOS MICHAELIDES HAS REPEATED HIS CALL FOR A SOLUTION BASED ON A UNITED ECONOMY AND STRESSED THAT THE VIABILITY OF THE SOLUTION TO BE FOUND WILL DEPEND ON ITS ECONOMIC VIABILITY.

«The bridging of the economic gap between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots must be a pressing concern. The Turkish Cypriots must seek it because it would mean better days for them and the Greek Cypriots must also seek it because it is the secure road towards smooth co-existence», he said.

Mr Michaelides was the guest speaker at the Rotarian Club of Limassol and chose as his subject «The Cyprus problem — The course of the Future».

He referred to the continuing dialogue and said the fact that it has functioned is certainly a positive element.

Speaking about the economic situation in the North Mr Michaelides said that even if the occupied area were not an extension of the Turkish economy, it could still not support a separate viable economy.

«The small size of the internal market, the lack of foreign exchange for the supply of raw materials, machinery, spare parts and the weakness in marketing products, does not allow industrial development and economic develop-

ment on a viable economic basis», he said.

The economic facts of the situation should underline the need for a quick solution of the Cyprus problem because essentially any delay, apart from other consequences, widens the economic gap between the government-controlled and the occupied areas.

Mr Michaelides listed three essentials for a cohesive bond between the people: First, a balanced development of all areas of Cyprus. Second: Equal opportunities for well being and progress for all, and Third:

Assistance for the weakest groups and individuals.

If all the areas of Cyprus do not develop in a balanced way, then it would be natural for severe tensions to exist due to economic contradictions of the different areas and the pressures for the movement of population and the tension would be even greater if the uneven development of different areas favours one or the other national groups, he explained.

It is obvious, Mr Michaelides declared, that for all time to function an integrated economy is essential. It would be naive for anyone to believe that Cyprus can support two economies, he said.

Mr Michaelides added that a basic precondition for a united economy was the free movement of goods and people. It is not merely a matter of protection of human rights — which it certainly is — but also an absolute necessity of practical economic arrangements.

How could it be possible in a country as small as Cyprus to introduce limitations on the free movement of people and commodities and at the same time to expect that the country would survive politically and economically? he asked.

Mr Michaelides pointed out that limitation of these principles would not merely affect the problem of the refugees but also form a barrier to Turkish Cypriots seeking work in another area and that would be to their detriment.

Barriers in the movement of commodities and people involve barriers to investments too and it would not be rational if barriers were erected against investment activities at a time when even developed countries give incentives to citizens of foreign countries for economic activity.

Such a development would harm the Greek Cypriots and would also condemn the Cypriots to economic stagnation, Mr Michaelides declared.

BENTONITE PROCESSING PLANT PLANNED

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 9-15 Jan 81 p 2

[Text]

A plant to process local bentonite is to be set up in Cyprus following tests carried out in the UK which showed that bentonite clay, found in plentiful amounts in the island, is good for industrial uses.

A public company is to be set up to run the plant and a government decision regarding the structure of the company and its financing is expected shortly.

Bentonite is described as "the industrial mineral with a thousand uses" - for drilling, foundries and iron ore pelletisation, among other things.

World needs

Its discovery in large quantities in the island could offset to some extent the loss in revenue from the depletion of other traditional mineral reserves such as copper.

An official of the Geological Department told the Cyprus Weekly: "World needs in bentonite are estimated at 5 million tons a year. We aim at covering three per cent of the market".

He stressed that the raw material was not only plentiful but inexpensive, and the capital investment required would be low.

Once a formal decision is taken on the matter, it would take only about a year to set up the plant. Industrial nations operating foundries and countries where oil drilling is going on would be the island's main customers.

Chemical properties

Some bentonite is already being marketed abroad by a private company.

The "bentonite project" was launched more than four years ago when a UNIDO expert arrived in the island to help investigate the possibilities of improving the qualities of Cyprus bentonites and testing their chemical and laundry-binder properties.

The investigations included extensive drilling, especially near Phinikaria village northeast of Limassol, which is considered the most favourable and promising prospect, as well as geological mapping and testing in the Department's laboratory and in a pilot plant. Some 1,200 samples from this area were investigated.

"The results obtained from the extensive laboratory and pilot plant investigations indicate that processed Cyprus bentonite does meet most of the requirements specified by International Standards for the various uses of bentonite", says Mr Georgios Constantinou, Director of the Geological Survey Department.

Before deciding whether it was wise to go ahead with the setting up of a plant to process local bentonite, large-scale testing had to be carried out in the United Kingdom.

Four large bentonite samples amounting to 12 tons, from the Phinikaria prospect, were properly treated, bagged and shipped to England for large-scale testing.

Grinding

The tests were carried out in three different institutes. They included bentonite processing at seven UK factories producing industrial machines related with the extrusion, drying, grinding and pulverising processes of bentonite.

"The results obtained from all such tests indicate that Cyprus bentonite, after proper treatment, is comparable to many other foreign bentonites extensively used in the international market, and satisfies most of the standard requirements relating to the main industrial uses of bentonite", Mr Constantinou says in his annual report.

Foreign exchange

The whole project has shown that the bentonite clays found in the island are amenable to treatment and exploitation. "The proposed establishment of a plant to process local bentonite and the export of its finished products would help recover some of the foreign exchange lost by the exhaustion of other mineral reserves", Mr Constantinou adds.

This was the highlight of the Department's investigations for non-metallic minerals.

The Geological Department is now facing a "major turning point" in its overall activities since its establishment in 1950. The gradual exhaustion of the traditional mineral resources (the copper ore deposits) has imposed the necessity of readjusting the Department's short and long-term aims and targets.

CSO: 4920

INDUSTRY COUNCIL STUDY SHOWS OIL CRISIS EFFECT ON TRADE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Dec 80 p 12

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] The development in Danish export and import of goods following the first oil crisis in 1974-75 is repeating itself now after the second oil crisis.

This was pointed out by the economists of the Industrial Council in the latest issue of ERHVERVSØKONOMISK BAROMETER.

After the first oil crisis a sharp decline in product imports was noted in 1974 but it took 6 months before product exports started to decline. In the interval the balance of trade improved dramatically and that is exactly the phase we are in now following the second oil crisis.

The industrial economists showed developments in volume imports and exports in the form of a curve, reproduced below by BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. The industrial economists make no secret of the fact that they believe history will repeat itself.

As the illustration shows product imports are declining more rapidly now than they did after the first oil crisis. But as we can see there was a sharp up-swing of imports in 1975 after the downturn and the same development is expected this time too. Some of the present import decline is due to the fact that businesses have stopped buying raw materials and are using up existing reserves instead. When domestic demand improves again the reserves must be replenished and product imports will rise sharply again.

The latest figures concerning the export order situation suggest that product exports will decline in 1981.


SDS Figures

Economists at the SDS Savings Bank have analyzed trade figures for the first 10 months of 1980. Compared with the same period the year before total product imports declined 6.3 percent in terms of volume. The biggest drop was in the product group of transportation means including ships and planes (minus 27 percent) but fuel (minus 13 percent) also declined sharply.

If we look at volume imports for the period August-October 1980 compared with the same 3-month period the year before, volume imports declined substantially for products used in construction (minus 20 percent) and products used in other urban businesses (minus 12 percent). These figures confirm the view that there is a downward adjustment of stockpiles which is temporarily benefitting trade balance.

On the export side in the first 10 months of 1980 volume product exports were 7.4 percent higher than exports in the same period in 1979. The increase has been especially large for "vegetable agricultural products" (up 17 percent) and machinery and instruments (plus 10 percent).

If one looks just at the 3-month period August-October total volume exports have risen only 3 percent.



Import and export developments for 1973-74 and 1979-80. (Seasonally-corrected development in imports and exports of products excluding ships and airplanes, in terms of volume.) Index 1973/1979 equals 100. Source: Industrial Council's ERHVERVSØKONOMISK BAROMETER, December 1980.

Key:

1. Imports

2. Exports

PAPER DETECTS NEW DESIRE FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH SDP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Dec 60 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text] Folketing members K. B. Andersen and Erik Ninn-Hansen don't have much in common. One is a Social Democrat, the other a Conservative and they have been regarded as being at opposite poles in their politics. However both have been leading politicians for many years. Ninn-Hansen entered Folketing for the first time in 1953, K. B. Andersen in 1957 and both have taken an active part in the political struggle since they were young. Now they are veterans and the time is past when personal ambitions dominated their attitudes. They speak out more freely than they used to. They no longer need to hold themselves in check but can speak solely on the basis of their considerable experience and the deep familiarity with political conditions produced by many years in politics.

Therefore it is worth noting that the two politicians share a common view of the current political situation. Ninn-Hansen has long advocated a coalition between the Social Democrats and the three old parties, the Liberals, the Conservatives and the Radical Liberals, in order to guarantee the nation a stable government. And recently K. B. Andersen expressed the same view. Of course as a loyal Social Democrat he deeply appreciates the fellowship his party has created with the small compromise parties. But he correctly pointed out the weaknesses of this fellowship as expressed in uncertainty as to whether all three parties will be found in Folketing after a future election.

Ninn-Hansen's idea was not met with equal enthusiasm in all ranks of the Conservative and Liberal parties. And K. B. Andersen can be sure that his idea is not shared by the prime minister or most of the Social Democratic group in Folketing. Even so one may hope that this coincidence of opinion between a Social Democrat and a Conservative will lead to reconsideration. There can be no doubt that it would have served the nation well if such a coalition had been established after last year's election. The election results showed that the voters wanted to rally round the old parties which through our history have confirmed their determination to carry the nation through years of crisis. But Anker Jorgensen was so busy forming his minority government that the idea of something different and better obviously never struck him. Instead he created a base for himself that is weak and insecure.

It is good to listen to the utterances of experienced men. But if their good ideas are to become a reality we will probably have to have a different prime minister. Has K. B. Andersen also thought about that?

BRIEFS

COMMITTEE STUDYING BORNHOLM DEFENSE--The Folketing Defense Committee will now look into the disparities between Defense Minister Poul Sogaard's statements on the effects of an unchanged defense budget on Bornholm and conflicting military reports showing a considerable decline in the standing forces on the island. Former Minister of Agriculture, Folketing member Niels Anker Kofoed (Liberal), who brought up the Bornholm defense issue, told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE he would ask the minister two questions through the Defense Committee: 1. Would the minister maintain that a training company is not being pulled out in February? 2. How will the minister make up for the 200 men in the standing forces who are lacking according to the norm for standing forces on Bornholm? "It is the minister's responsibility to make sure the forces on Bornholm match the standard that has been set. I don't feel at all reassured by the minister's statements on Bornholm Tuesday. He didn't take up materiel conditions and he evaded the problem of shortages in the standing forces. I would also like to tell the minister that the reason I didn't bring this up when we were both in the government is that it is the defense minister's job to make sure the defense agreement is maintained." [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Dec 80 p 4] 6578

CSO: 3106

CONTINUED PROBLEMS WITH DEFENSE BUDGET, TORNADO FINANCING

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 29 Dec 80 pp 19-21

[Text] With an additional DM 700 million for the Tornado fighter aircraft Minister of Defense Apel only appears to be out of the woods: By 1985 there will be a shortfall of DM 10 billion for additional projects.

SPD delegate Peter Wuertz, who had attracted the particular ire of Hans Apel with impertinent comments about the bankruptcy of the Tornado fighter, wanted to put his colleague in a conciliatory mood with a joke.

During a discussion he handed a billion mark note and a 500 million mark note to the minister of defense. A constituent in his electoral district Diepholz had given the worthless inflationary money from the Weimar Republic to the delegate, saying that Apel should plug the 1.3 billion mark hole in his budget with them and keep "the rest as a tip."

The defense department head took it in good humor, but he could not stifle a sigh: "Yes, if it were only that simple."

There really was nothing to laugh about before Christmas for the usually ebulliently cheerful Hamburger--Hans Apel's activities during the last work week in Bonn before the vacation were more like running the gauntlet.

His most difficult mission was to the final cabinet consultations on the 1981 budget. "Pale, with twitching face muscles" (a government member), the minister described how a financial shortfall for the multipurpose Tornado fighter had arisen through a series of sloppy calculations--DM 512 million this year and about DM 800 million next year (SPIEGEL 51/1980).

Then Apel asked his colleagues for assistance. He did not mention resignation directly, but he made it clear that he could "not survive" the affair without a substantial boost in his budget; 1.5 billion were already needed to help him out of the hole. Apel told the meeting of ministers: "You can have me shot, but let's pay the bills first."

Hans Matthoefer did not want to come up with any additional money. The minister of finance loudly denounced incompetent bureaucrats on the Hardthoehe and in NATO.

The CDU's defense expert, Manfred Woerner, Matthoefer said pointedly, had obviously learned of the money problems earlier than Apel.

Apel tried to be soothing: he said that if he were still occupying Matthoefer's chair, he would certainly "be shouting even more"; but it had happened, and he asked the cabinet not to leave him high and dry.

The first one to come to the defense of his hard pressed colleague was Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The FDP leader reminded everyone of the government's poor start, at which time it could not afford a minister's resignation. Immediate action was indicated above all for reasons of foreign policy: "We have to send a signal to the new U.S. administration." Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was in agreement.

When Matthoefer remained stubborn, one person jumped up, from whom any such commitment in defense matters had been least expected. SPD party leader Herbert Wehner said: "If you cannot grasp what is at stake here, I must ask myself if you still have my confidence as minister of finance."

It helped. During the lunch break Schmidt, Matthoefer and Apel clarified everything: The defense budget for 1981 was increased by DM 700 million. Apel, who had already scraped together DM 350 million for unpaid Tornado accounts, for his part has to save another DM 262 million.

The resolution to postpone the 1980 deficit in the amount of DM 512 million until the new year is also at least a partial help out of another dilemma. The correct budgetary solution would have been an additional supplemental budget. But that would have meant that the rate of increase for 1981 would necessarily have been calculated on the basis of a defense budget increased by DM 512 million in 1980.

The consequence: Bonn would have even greater difficulty meeting the obligations it has made to NATO, according to which real defense expenditures are to be increased annually by 3 percent. At the moment, with Matthoefer's DM 700 million donation, they are already a good 2 percent.

The temporary assurance of Tornado finances and the mathematical tricks with the NATO percentages cannot hide the fact that the most difficult times still await Hans Apel. Already it is clear that by 1985 DM 10 billion will be lacking for major acquisitions--besides the Tornado the F 122 frigate, the Leopard 2 tank and the strike aircraft Alpha Jet--as well as for a number of smaller projects.

Today Georg Leber's words sound derisive; shortly before his departure as minister of defense he stated that his successor would only have to pay for what he (Leber) had ordered. By 1982 at the latest financing costly defenses will be a poker game.

In the coming year defense planners hope to manage tolerably by means of economy measures. In addition to appropriations for research and development the principal cuts will be in expenditures for material upkeep and fuel. That means less training and more time in the barracks and on useless activities--with serious consequences for the already poor morale of the troops.

On the Thursday before last Apel made the gloomy prediction before the FDP party that there would still "be a wailing and gnashing of teeth."

It is not even certain whether the minister of defense is now out of his difficulties, at least in the Tornado matter. When he had to attend a question and answer session of a joint session of the budget and defense committees a few hours after his appearance before the Liberals, coalition delegates could not but have the impression that the opposition still had a few arrows left in its quiver.

Apel himself is not prepared to exclude unpleasant surprises: "I have no way of knowing when the next mine will explode."

It was noticeable how heavily the CDU/CSU concentrated on the question of when the minister was informed of the financial gap for his superplane. Apel's stock answer is that he learned of the full extent of the disaster only on 17 November.

Twice CDU budget committee member Manfred Carstens wanted to know whether "the election had played a role" in the entire matter. Apel denied this.

Then Manfred Woerner spoke; in the preceding legislative term he was chairman of the defense committee and, as CDU/CSU party deputy, is now responsible for external affairs and defense policy. He demanded that official documents should be presented at the next session and that those involved should be questioned. Social Democrat Horst Jungmann responded: "Are we an investigating committee?" To which Woerner replied: "No, but if we don't get the documents, then you can have one."

For the time being, the Social Liberals are being saved from that prospect by an internal Union problem: Unlike Woerner, his successor as chairman of the defense committee Werner Marx does not have the qualifications for a judiciary position and consequently would have to relinquish the chair in an investigating committee.

But coalition members fear that the Union could exert sufficient pressure even in the defense committee. For example, Woerner wants to see the letter of 28 May in which Inspector General Juergen Brandt indicated possible financial problems to his minister--according to Apel's information only in a general form.

In addition Woerner is asking to see the minutes from a conference of department heads held on the Hardthoehe, at which the same topic was discussed, also in May. Apel's Under-Secretary Joachim Hiehle says that such minutes do not exist.

Another corpus delicti is discussed only in whispers and with a hand in front of one's mouth. Supposedly the armament department of Apel's ministry prepared a paper in February which showed that the British, who had been hampered by strikes at the outset, had made up their Tornado deficit and that, as a result, a greater burden could be anticipated on the 1980 budget. This document is said to bear Apel's signature.

If that were accurate, the minister would really be in the soup. The very mildest criticism would say that Apel, even though informed in ample time, had not pushed

his officials to take action; the harshest would say that he had not told the truth to the delegates.

What is certain is that his armament department requested additional funds for the supplementary 1980 budget for fuel and munitions but not for the Tornado.

It is also certain that the first unscheduled Tornado accounts, which reached the ministry at the end of July or beginning of August, were not exactly evaluated as alarm signals. The budget and armament departments only agreed to make a preliminary examination of the papers, for one thing to see if they were legally binding. It is unclear whether Apel was informed of this.

The minister now believes that he has learned all there is to know about his problem plane: "I could apply as the next Tornado contractor." He is also confident that with organizational and personnel changes in his ministry he can prevent similar breakdowns in the future. But he is far from feeling at ease.

On Thursday evening of the week before last, at the improvised farewell speech for his armaments Under-Secretary Karl Schnell, who is retiring, Apel said: "Perhaps times will come that are even more difficult than these. The thought cannot be excluded."

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PROGRESS IN ARMY REORGANIZATION EXAMINED

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Dec 80 pp 683-684

[Text] Since 1 October the army has reorganized its divisions into a fourth structure. We first published information about the new structure in volumes 11/76 and 12/78. Army inspector Lt Gen Hans Poeppel has discussed the problems resulting from the reorganization in his article entitled "Modern Weapons Technology and Training in the Army," published in volume 11/80. Since our readers continue to inquire about further details and about a realistic description of the reorganization, we are publishing the following summary of this process which is so important for European defense within NATO.

Beginning 1 October 1980, four of the 12 army divisions have been restructured:

The second light infantry division in Kassel, now designated as the second mechanized infantry division.

The third armored division in Buxtehude.

The seventh mechanized infantry division in Unna, now designated as seventh armored division.

The twelfth armored division in Veitshoechheim.

The further reorganization will occur in several carefully coordinated steps. It will be essentially concluded in 1981 for the ground forces, and in 1985 for the national guard.

The new structure had been decided on in November 1978 by Minister of Defense Dr Hans Apel, after long years of planning and testing of various structure models. It increases the army's combat strength. The army now has at its disposal 36 standing, high-quality brigades, as opposed to 33 in the past. The combat preparedness of the national guard is considerably improved. The potential of trained reservists is better utilized for increased additional combat strength. The new structure makes the acceptance of important new weapons possible.

Those brigades which have been organized according to the new structure since the field tests in 1976 have proven themselves in this year's army maneuvers. At the conclusion of the maneuvers, the inspector stated: "Their structure has clear strategic and tactical advantages. Antitank strength and mobility are improved. The coming reorganization will demand all our strength. It is important that no essential combat preparedness be lost during the reorganization process. The end result will be a structure which meets the demands of the 1980's and which gives the army a considerable increase in combat strength."

The defense minister's decision of November 1978 regarding the new structure had been preceded by years of planning at army headquarters and by 1 year of testing of five different brigade structures in the years 1976 and 1977.

The concept which forms the basis for the new structure calls for an increase in conventional combat strength by increasing combat preparedness of combat and support units as well as their growth potential in such a way that it results in increased combat strength even in the case of alert. The combat readiness and combat strength of the national guard had to be improved. The army's large-sized units require a structure which allows for optimal utilization of the planned for equipment--in accordance with its high technical quality--and for increased strategic mobility of troops.

The Ground Forces

The basic organizational structure of the ground forces, the division into corps, divisions, brigades and battalions, remains unchanged.

The ground forces continue to consist of three corps with their respective corps troops. Three antitank helicopter regiments are added to the corps. The corps' antiaircraft forces are restructured into one Roland antiaircraft regiment each.

The corps lead 12 divisions, 11 of them with the corresponding division troops. In these 11 divisions, the antiaircraft units are equipped with the new Gepard tanks equipped with antiaircraft cannon, and are reorganized into regiments. In order to increase the infantry's combat strength, two light infantry battalions are assigned to each division. In the sixth mechanized infantry division, they are partially active, in the remaining divisions they are equipment units.

Decisive changes are made in the brigades. More and smaller units are formed. This allows for better utilization of the potential of increased combat efficiency of modern technology. Divisions and units can react with increased speed. More heavy weapons systems are constantly in use.

Of the formerly 33 brigades, which have now been increased to 36, 17 are armored brigades, 15 mechanized infantry brigades, 3 airborne brigades, and one is a mountain brigade. All brigades have the high degree of combat preparedness required for quick and sudden defense.

The brigades will in future have four combat battalions, each of which will contain three companies. This means that they will have a total of 12 combat companies, as opposed to nine at present. In peacetime, four companies each will

be under three battalion headquarters. The fourth battalion headquarter will grow out of the three battalion headquarters plus reservists in case of alert.

Companies will be smaller than they are now. The mechanized company has 13 tanks, the mechanized infantry company 11 APC's or armored personnel vehicles. Administrative and supply tasks are divided between battalion and company in such a way that the company commander will have increased responsibility for the leadership, education and training of his soldiers.

In summary: All this will make the ground forces more combat efficient. Conditions for strategic leadership are improved. Appropriate conditions are created for planned armament and equipment.

The National Guard

The commando structure remains with national guard commandos, regional commandos, district commandos and county commandos. The new structure does, however, bring about changes for the alert and security troops, i.e. the reservists.

Six reservist brigades are organized and equipped just like the mechanized infantry brigades. They, too, have four combat battalions and one artillery battalion. They are equipped with combat tanks, armored personnel carrier vehicles, anti-tank rocket systems and artillery. Even in peacetime one reservist brigade has 85 percent of its defense strength in personnel, the remaining two have 52 percent. There are plans for an additional six reservist brigades--equipped with heavy weapons. In peacetime they are equipment units.

To the national guard security troops belong 15 reservist regiments with 45 light infantry battalions for the protection of the area, and 150 reservist companies and 300 platoons for the protection of property and equipment in the rear area. In peacetime they consist of equipment units.

The heavy weapons required for the increased combat strength of the reservists are gradually becoming available: Weapons which have been replaced in the army through modernization continue to be used by the national guard--some of them after modifications. No new heavy weapons have to be procured.

In summary: The combat strength of the reservists is increased. Strategic freedom of NATO forces on German soil is secured. Additional large units are freed as reserves for defense at the front.

The Reservists

The new structure makes better use of the potential of trained reservists. The graduated combat readiness is maintained: Corps and division troops continue to be dependent on parts for mobilization. But it requires more reservists than in the past in order to quickly fill cadre units in the ground forces and the national guard, and to increase defense capability of the additional national guard alert troops and security troops. For this purpose, alert standbys, alert reservists and active officers and NCO's from military offices and schools have been included in the plans.

In order that the cadres in the units of the ground forces and of the national guard can quickly pull together and fulfill their missions in case of alert, they must practice as units during peacetime. For this reason, the number of fields available for military exercises is increased by approximately 50 percent. In the future, 210,000 reservists—as opposed to 130,000 in the past—will exercise annually in the ground forces alone—most of them in the unit they will be assigned to, national guard alert troops in their own unit.

In summary: Approximately 40 percent more reservists than in the past are used more efficiently. With the help of these reservists, the army's deterrence and defense capability is increased.

The Reorganization

The reorganization takes place in several carefully coordinated steps. The main concentration will be in the years 1980 and 1981. It is to be essentially concluded in 1985.

The army's inspector general stated regarding the reorganization plan: "The army's combat preparedness must remain assured during this process. Social hardships must be limited to a minimum by carefully prepared and coordinated reorganization steps." Based on these conditions, the reorganization plan is as follows:

The ground forces are being reorganized in three 6-month phases beginning 1 October 1980. In each 6-month phase, the reorganization of four divisions and of a part of the corps troops is planned. The ground forces will be reorganized at the end of 1981 with the exception of a few elements. Some of the measures depend on the acquisition of new weapons systems, e.g. of the Leopard 2 combat tank, of the antitank helicopter 1, of the Gepard and Roland antiaircraft tanks. This reorganization, which is dependent on weapons systems, has already begun in 1979 and runs parallel to the other measures. It concerns especially the army's flying troops, the signal troops, artillery, the antiaircraft troop, the engineers and the antitank units.

In the national guard, the first of the six partially active national guard brigades will be reorganized in the second quarter of 1981. The remaining brigades will follow in the fourth quarter. Additional national guard troops and services—among them the six reservist brigades (equipment units)—will be reorganized in a parallel action. The reorganization will presumably take until the middle, in part until the end of the 1980's, especially for reasons of infrastructure and because it is dependent on weapons released by the ground forces.

In summary: The reorganization of the ground forces will be concluded at the end of 1981 in its most important aspects, in 1985 with the majority of measures, and at the end of the 1980's with the remaining steps in the national guard. The army's reorganization into the fourth structure has been initiated based on the decision by the minister of November 1978.

AUTHORS DEBATE FOREIGN POLICY REALPOLITIK IN TIES TO USSR

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 13 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by Ralf Friberg: "An Exchange of Letters About Our One-Dimensional Country"]

[Text] The one-dimensional realism in Finland's foreign policy is becoming troublesome to some intellectuals. In a striking number of current pamphlets runs a gray thread of dissatisfaction with the practical formulation of our country's assumed position. Our policy lacks an answer to the moral dilemmas of which our times seem to have so many.

Documentation of the assertion is not necessary. One finds the reaction in the artistically sensitive seismographs (Ilmari Salama: "A Year of My Life") or in the odd political personalities (Erkki Tuomioja: "Critique of a Democracy Without an Alternative.")

An exciting dialogue concerning cynicism versus realism in Finnish foreign policy is carried on in the book of letters "Speaking of Finland" (Puhe on Suomesta). Parties in the dialogue are Johannes Salminen, Ph D, and Professor Antti Eskola.

Some time in the spring of 1980: Antti Eskola wrote "In our times it is customary to recommend to small nations that they carry on a completely cynical foreign policy, and our mini-Kekkonens seem to have absorbed only cynicism from the father's line. For example, Finland needs not be reliable, if only 'the credibility of foreign policy exists'."

In a later letter Eskola continues his criticism. He does not think it well considered of the President to later send Chief Editor Talvi a letter which reminded Talvi that foreign policy provocations could lead to punishment. Here, the interesting part is not the criticism of Kekkonen's letter, but Antti Eskola's conclusion:

"This creates fear and submission which the elite in power misuses for egoistical purposes. A letter of this kind can also have direct negative effects since in the corps of jurists and civil servants one always finds single-tracked individuals such as Tuomas in 'Seven Brothers' who when the elder brother cries out 'throw him to the bulls', think it meant as an order."

Eskola is a member of the people's democratic movement, and his sympathy lies closer to the minority than the majority. It is not expected that he would be so critical of the "intriguers" who watch over the interests of the upper classes both the present and the former. "When such men open their mouths one knows with certainty what suits their purpose. Truth and justice do not enter into their actions and purposes."

More to be expected is that Johannes Salminen gives a analysis of the responses of the foreign policy to events in the world. For a long time he has been an iconoclast, at first in relation to our country's past in a bourgeois description, later as a questioner of social policy, as carried on by both the right and the left.

Johannes Salminen therefore begins with a historical perspective, the Czar's Finnish subjects in the Grand Duchy of the 1800's, faithful to his foreign policy. "The Finns were at that time a kind of European champion in making themselves invisible." This has left its mark upon the soul of the people, and in several places in the letters Salminen shows irritation at the people of Finland being so passive, so meek and submissive.

A Game at High Levels

But the consequences of realism in foreign policy? Everything becomes merely a game at these high altitudes, where conscience and truth, in the sense the citizen attaches to the words, are not allowed to bind the participants. With reference to a recent Kekkonen quotation, Salminen speaks of an "ethical vacuum." It cannot be satisfactory to rely upon the friendship of moral eunuchs, he concludes. The eunuch is Finland.

Revolution from Ambush

What, then, can be the consequence of "neorealism" in foreign policy? Eskola is thinking of the time after Kekkonen. "These questions will become important when somebody else begins to carry out our foreign policy after Kekkonen, when one can no longer ask its developer for the correct interpretation of it." In Eskola's version the prospect becomes apocalyptic as concerns capitalist Finland: "We shall see a shell that conceals only emptiness and which course has the moral resources when during a crisis the Soviet Union announces that there is a threat of an attack by Germany or a state allied to Germany, and when the Soviet Union, despite assurances from Finland, sticks to its standpoint. Negotiations on military cooperation follow, and the great foreign policy pressure then produced consequences in domestic policy as well. Such a situation offers many possibilities," writes Eskola, alluding to his quoted allegory about the revolutionary who, like an Indian, waits for his opportunity and later jumps out of ambush to catch his prey, namely a socialist Finland. While Eskola dreams about the revolution now and then and Salminen is sarcastic, the Swedish-Finnish letter writer sees the risk of everything being toned down for foreign policy considerations:

"If we are not careful we shall once more one day find ourselves in Nicholas I's little Finnish pen, where, free of the great European debate, we are permitted to deal with our moose hunter as best we can."

There is reason to take note of the increasing criticism of a foreign policy, one-dimensional to such a degree that not even the intellectual challenge of practicing Machiavellian statesmanship constitutes an enticement.

This is evidence of a breach in the situation, which has already occurred. And criticism hits least of all Urho Kekkonen. He has done his part, and, as is known, on the threshold of his 80th birthday he published a blue book "Tamminiemi," with Eskudden's political philosophy in a nutshell.

Interpreters in the Line of Fire

It is the exegetes who cause the debate. If at one time the situation has been that Urho Kekkonen during the entire postwar period has been our foreign policy leader, a creeping feeling of emptiness is now beginning to appear. Observers such as Tuomioja have the opportunity to recollect, in the latest issue of YDIN, that "Everything that is good in foreign policy cannot be said to have come about against the will of the people, or at least against the will of the whole people. Since we in Finland have not built our state upon the doctrine of one infallible party, nor should we do it upon the doctrine of an infallible foreign policy leadership."

Part of the present reaction can be explained by Finnish debaters and politicians now in rich measure harvesting the fruits of Kekkonen's work for security. Relatively speaking, we still stand aside from the storm raging in Asia or the cold waves that wash over superpower relations. Or better: we believe we are standing aside, but we do not know.

Part of the reaction may also be caused by the "neorealism" of our foreign policy in its most recent interpretation having come to include many other areas than those in which the demands of Finnish-Soviet relations take precedence. One needs only think of our country's aid policy, which can be attractive to people only if it contains a dimension of morality and solidarity. Or consider our refugee policy.

The reaction by writers and intellectuals can also have arisen because the interpreters are most often persons in civil service positions. People are sensitive perhaps because something unaccounted for is about to happen. No politician of sufficient stature, who could be held responsible in open debate, has appeared to take responsibility for interpretation of neorealism.

Debate on the Nature of the Nation's Vital Problems

The book by Johannes Salminen and Antti Eskola naturally deals with other things than foreign policy. But the two men never stray far from the basic problems of the life and welfare of the Finnish nation in the world of the 1980's.

To Salminen these great problems are intimately connected with musing on the personal integrity and vigilance of the citizen. Clearly, in Salminen's example the citizen is an articulate, educated, and competent member of the social elite. But let that pass. Such a person, as well, lacks moral courage in the society of today. The same Finn who privately fears neither God nor the devil when he defends his territory becomes a sheep-like mähä (sic) when required to show moral courage. Perhaps the Hegelian J.V. Snellman is to blame, he who put the small crumbs of his intellect up against "common sense." While Salminen fixes his gaze upon the historical mystery of how thousands of people in 1867 and 1868 obligingly laid down to die without protest while the lords in Helsinki just talked, he is today not struck by

the fact that thousands of people, mostly young, go jobless without protest while the Helsinki lords, headed by the labor minister, are powerless to do anything.

A People Without a History

Antti Eskola believes that moral courage is meaningless unless it is part of a mass movement. But he also believes that our uncertainty and our abrupt changes in temperament are caused by the majority of our citizens constituting a people without a history. We have just come out of the dark woods.

All the passivity, and the silence cannot be charged to instincts and the collective consciousness of a scattered people of the forest. Salminen draws a quick caricature, also dated Helsinki, 1980: "See how we move, nervously sniffing for the wind direction in an indigenous terrain, where the least carelessness can rob us of a stipend or a promotion, or an invitation to the palace. And how calculating we are in our protest--one may cause annoyance, as long as one is not really dangerous."

Eskola's comforting words are not readily applied to Salminen, and his response is irritating because it misses the mark.

"It is easy in Finland to be applauded for criticizing Marxism and the Soviet system. This will perhaps not result in a political appointment or an invitation to the palace, but this is compensated for by the citizens' warm trust, a thick bundle of bills from the cultural fund, a full page in HELSINGIN SANOMAT about your ideas, and the wave of praise that rolls up to you from the West across the Gulf of Bothnia."

Socialism in Finnish

In this book Salminen and Eskola carry on a long conversation on the possible coming of socialism to Finland. It is impossible to review this discussion within the space limit of a newspaper article. But it is noteworthy that Eskola's account of the insecurity of being a Marxist in Finland meets with Salminen's warm sympathy, almost commiseration. Eskola's examination of the appearance of the Marxist school in the university world of Finland is also an important presentation. This school is exclusively a product of the 1970's.

The tone in "Speaking of Finland" becomes more pleasant and personal as the exchange of letter proceeds. At first, the reader has the feeling that the fencer Salminen takes Antti Eskola's measure, while Eskola responds by boxing. The exchange of ideas soon becomes more profound, however, and turns into an honest conversation about important questions in the Finland of today. It is possible to be irritated by Salminen's tendency to see much of what goes on today from the historical perspective of a past century, but this way of looking at things should probably be regarded as an attempt to build a bridge between Finland's normal life in peace and security as a grand duchy in the safe embrace of the Russian Empire and the Finland of the 1980's, firmly anchored in fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Union and the agreements between our countries.

Malice About Aarne Saarinen

I was even more irritated when I read Eskola's venomous remarks about the general perniciousness of the Social Democrats and his shabby attack upon Aarne Saarinen, PKK [expansion unknown] chairman. In these letters Eskola stands out as a child of his time, heavily marked by the inner schisms in the communist and peoples democratic movements.

"Speaking of Finland" was commissioned by Tammi Publishers. Salminen and Eskola had not met when the idea of the book was first broached. Considering the book's origin and its title, which brings to mind a pretentious and typically poorly written article in SUOMEN KUVALEHTI, the final result is worth reading.

It cannot have been an easy task to translate Johannes Salminen's nuanced text to smooth Finnish. As it is, Salminen in Finnish compared very well with Antti Eskola's more lush style ("What a novelist Eskola could have been," exclaims publisher Salminen after having read an agitated tirade by the Tampere sociologist.) Credit for the excellent translation goes to Risto Hannula. His text is very much alive.

When one reads Salminen and Eskola it is worth noting that their artistic and social sensitivity produces seismic manifestations, not necessarily corresponding to the realistic (sic!) and day-to-day political situation in the country. But the sensitivity produces responses and undercurrents in popular opinion, which should be collected and analyzed. For example, in foreign policy the correctness of the line is measured against its success. Perhaps it is time to begin to look after the people's psyche for the purpose of prevention, so that the tremors in the seismic instruments will remain just tremors.



Johannes Salminen (left) and Antti Eskola exchange letters Concerning the Nation in a book which is being published by Tammi. The book is here reviewed by Ralf Friberg.

VALMET READY TO BEGIN SERIES PRODUCTION OF HAWK TRAINER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Dec 60 p 28

[Article by Erkki Arni: "Couple of Hawks Arriving"]

[Text] First two Hawk trainers flying to Finland Tuesday.
Other English planes to be assembled at VALMET Kuorevesi plant.

Of the 50 British Aerospace Hawk trainers procured for the Finnish Air Force, four are to be built in England and the remaining 46 are to be assembled at the VALMET Kuorevesi plant.

The parts for two Hawks have already been shipped to Kuorevesi as samples for the existing assembly production program.

Two planes, the HW-302 and HW-303, will be officially turned over to the Finnish Government Tuesday and will be flown from England to Finland. After that, planes will continue to be shipped as parts.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT London correspondent Erkki Arni has visited the British Aerospace plant to see how the Hawks are manufactured.

The construction of the Hawks begins with pieces of metal. Some of them are small aluminum sheets from which reinforcing elements, ribs or ports are pressed or bent.

Others are lumps: difficult to work but hard and light titanium. Rings and other fasteners which are subject to severe stress are made of these.

Some of the metal consists of sturdy aluminum plates about the size of church door panels. Huge machines cut these into the upper and lower surfaces of the wings out on one piece and in a single operation.

The fuselage sections, entire wing and tail sections are gradually assembled with these and other pieces. In this three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle the metal becomes an airplane.

British Aerospace is a nationalized aviation industry corporation which is a merger of most of England's former aircraft industry plants, well-known in their time. Four [as published] production plants participate in the manufacture of the Hawks:

Brough in Northern England, Bitteswell in Central England, Kingston in the London suburbs, Dunsfold southwest of London and Hamble on the south coast.

Parts of the three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle can be found in all of them. Non-descript looking sheets of metal sprayed with a yellow protective paint are riveted together in special jigs and after a little while the recognizable nose of an aircraft has taken shape out of the sheets of metal. Other pieces produce a horizontal stabilizer which is just as recognizable and still others the wings.

The fuselage sections are assembled in special frames or jigs with the aid of which components manufactured at the other end of the kingdom are fitted together with a precision of 1/100th of a millimeter. The wings are assembled in their own jigs.

Mass-Produced Aircraft

At the most part unnoticeable series of small operations takes place on the aircraft production line. The fuselage seems to be just lying in its jig without anything happening to it, but inside men working precisely with their tools scramble about and industriously grope about with their lights. For the structure of an aircraft is a shell which can hold a lot of things. The engine goes into its own space in the middle of the aircraft; the fuel tank is packed into another one.

Thick bundles of electric leads, like the aircraft's nervous system, crisscross every nook and cranny. Alongside and between them are the hydraulic lines through which the liquid used for the steering controls, landing gear and other mechanisms flows under pressure. Oxygen lines, air conditioning tubes and fuel lines have to be crammed in with the rest of them. Sliding levers, joints and hinges for the controls have to be crammed in there. Instrument boards, switch panels and control consoles with all their delicate mechanisms have to be installed in the cockpit.

Together on the job at the Kingston plant, Reg Spires has his head, shoulders and hands in the unfinished front half of a fuselage. One might take him for a textile mill worker for in front of him are bunches of pretty, multicolored strands. Actually, he is installing electric leads in thick bundles in the side console of the cockpit and fastening plug boards with tens and tens of holes in them in place. The skeins of wire are assembled on long tables on which the circuit diagrams and connection locations are drawn, like a map of some railroad yard. They can then be lifted from them and slipped into place in the aircraft as fully assembled networks.

Assembly Demands Cleanliness

At the other side of the room there is a nearly finished Hawk fuselage. Neil Marker is hunched over in the cockpit. He is tightening steering control connecting nuts underneath the floor. Kim Mitchell has pushed a hose through a hole in the top of the fuselage and is vacuuming it clean before installing the pressurized oil tank.

Cleanliness is important. "Tools, bolts or bore chips can fall into the fuselage of the aircraft," Bitteswell manager Bill Eardley said. "If they are left in it, they could even cause the controls to jam in flight. That is why we rotate each Hawk fuselage at least three times."

The fuselage is placed in a special cradle in which it is slowly rotated like a pig on a spit. In addition, it is simultaneously rocked so that any loose trash is sure to drop out of it.

The appropriate hydraulic lines, leads, fuel pump cylinders and other mechanisms are similarly installed in the wing. The landing gear comes from a special plant — as do tens of other products manufactured by subcontractors, from batteries to hydraulic pumps, from ejection seats to oxygen valves — and the main supports are attached to the wing. It is placed in a jig, the hydraulic lines and equipment are pressurized and the system is tested.

A month and a half ago the HW-303 fuselage was moved into a predetermined spot in the Dunsfold plant assembly room. Installation operations up to that point had been completed and the fuselage was awaiting its wings. They were brought in at the proper time on their own carriers and the fuselage was lifted onto them and attached to them. Hydraulic lines and leads and fuel lines and steering levers were linked to one another with speed connectors as called for in the plans and manufactured during preliminary stages of construction. An Adour engine had arrived from the Rolls Royce plant along with the proper auxiliary equipment. It was lifted into place, attached, connected and inspected.

White-Jacketed Inspectors Run Tests

After the HW-303 was assembled, it was lifted onto a trestle and tested. With the aid of an electric testing table, current was supplied to the appropriate circuits for each lead at a time. If there were any connection errors or breaks in the lines, they would be spotted, could be analyzed and repaired immediately.

The steering controls were manipulated, the landing flaps lowered and raised, the air brake opened and closed. The fuel tank was filled and kerosene fed through the lines. Very suspicious white-jacketed quality-control inspectors followed everything and took notes. Just as suspicious as they, other, blue-jacketed quality-control inspectors did the same thing a second time. When they had passed on it, the plane was getting to be nearly ready to be flown.

Canopy Baked in Giant Oven

Instruments, radio and electronic equipment were still to be tuned and adjusted, the steering controls to be adjusted and the ejection seat to be set in place. And the windshield and canopy were installed over the cockpit.

They are manufactured at Hamble. The Hawk canopy plant is like a scene in hell from some Fellini film. More than 10 men are standing around with their hands in asbestos mittens, waiting in front of an oven. Opposite it is a canopy-sized mold. It is hot and completely covered with steaming grease.

The doors of the garage-sized oven are jerked open. The team of men rushes to snatch out of the oven a frame on which a sheet of plexiglass a couple of meters long and wide is quivering. It has been baked so hot that it hangs there quite loosely. It has to be handled deftly so that it does not split.

The men carry the sheet quickly, like shock troops, over to the mold. They press it onto the mold until the grease sizzles and thick steam belches forth. Two of the men tighten the sides of the frame into place while the others pour oil on the plastic to cool it off.

As soon as it has cooled, they trim the edges, visually inspect it for flaws and finally attach it to its frame.

Expensive Windshield Is Drawn Out

The windshield is an even more precise job. Through it the fighter plane pilot takes aim. It is made of thick, drawn acrylic plastic. "If this material is reheated after it has been shaped, it bounces back to its original form, to the same lump which we drew out into a windshield," said John Eckstein, an engineer who knows almost everything about aircraft plastics.

The transparency of an acrylic windshield is as good as the best grade of glass. The windshield's optical "straightness" is checked with the aid of a light-ray sighting instrument, a collimator. Flaws are mercilessly revealed and even the smallest flaw means rejection.

"This is no small matter. A windshield alone, without a frame, costs 1,740 pounds or about 15,600 marks. Tell them that they should for God's sake not let their mechanics clean it off with just any old bit of cotton waste," Eckstein said. "They think they are polishing it but actually they leave hairline scratches that only decrease visibility and which cannot be gotten rid of in any way."

Test Flight Lasts Not Quite an Hour

Finally, it is time for the test pilots. "I usually make the first flights on the Hawks," chief test pilot Jim Hawkin said. "That can take about 50 minutes."

Instrument readings, radio performance, engine RPMs and temperatures. Proper functioning of landing gear and landing flaps, sensitivity of steering controls, ability to maintain level flight at suddenly reduced speed. Dive to the speed of sound and sharply come out of it at 900 km an hour. Engine response, accuracy of directional equipment. Altogether 28 main points or nearly 130 different tests. During later flights, further details will be checked on.

The Finnish Hawks are slightly differently equipped from those supplied to the Royal Air Force. "A tactical navigation and guidance system, Saab sights, an improved attitude-control meter, swifter transmission of steering control movements, an acceleration pump that will increase engine response," Hawkins enumerated.

After the HW-302 and HW-303, he will probably not be flying any more Finnish Hawks. Most of the partially finished Hawks still come from British Aerospace, but from now on VALMET will be assembling Finnish Hawks with Finnish labor.

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STATISTICS OFFICE DISCUSSES YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Dec 80 p 34

[Article: "One Out of Every Five Youths Unemployed Last Year"]

[Text] Nearly one out of every five youths was unemployed last year, as revealed in the Statistics Office study on last year's labor force. One out of eight of the entire working-age population was unemployed at least once last year.

According to the study, based on interviews, almost 13 percent of those from 15 to 64 years of age, or 412,000, were unemployed. A year earlier the corresponding number of unemployed was almost 100,000 more or a good 15 percent.

One out of every three unemployed had already been continuously unemployed for at least a year. In comparison with the previous study, the percentage of long-term unemployed has clearly increased. The percentage of unemployed women rose by about a half, since it was 44 percent a year earlier.

Recruits were in general unemployed at least once last year. The study reported that 35 percent of the recruits were unemployed.

The number of those classified as covertly unemployed dropped to 73,000 last year, whereas a year earlier it was about 100,000. At the time the study was made, there were 123,000 regularly unemployed recorded. There were 109,000 who intended to go to work at some time during the year. Figured in this way, last year there were all in all 304,000 people "who wanted to work" but were out of work, whereas a year earlier there were 366,000.

According to the manpower study, part-time work has not spread in Finland. A year ago last fall there were 162,000 part-time workers, the major part of them, or 126,000, women.

Last year as it was before then, difficulty in finding full-time jobs was the commonest reason for working part time. Thirty-eight thousand women who designated themselves as out of work gave this reason. The commonest reason why women work part time was because they have to take care of their homes or children.

On the other hand, 12 percent of those fully employed wanted to switch to part-time jobs. Of these, 134,000 wanted to permanently switch to part time and 82,000 temporarily so.

Among other things, the manpower study further reveals that the wives of about 76 percent of the married men held jobs. Last year there were about 600,000 families in which both husband and wife held jobs.

ARMY CARRIES OUT HYDROCOPTER EXERCISES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Dec 80 p 3

[Text] Parainen (HS)—Never before have so many hydrocopters been on the move together as on Thursday in Parainen during the coastal artillery regiments' training exercises. Nearly all of the Army's some 20 hydrocopters alternately competed on the ice and afterward in formation splashed into the open water during the Lielax exercises.

The first hydrocopter was procured for the armed forces 7 years ago. At the present time there are already about 20 of them. The original function of the domestic hydrocopters procured for the coastal forts was to serve only as a means for rescuing people when the roads are in bad condition but, according to General Staff Transport Division Capt Seppo Heinonen, their use has today already become 10 times more important.

The hydrocopter is the last rescue device to be used when boats or helicopters are no longer capable of moving because of weather conditions. In addition to water and ice, the hydrocopter also travels across snow, pack ice and roads with high centers.

While it already costs from 6,000 to 10,000 marks an hour to use a helicopter, a hydrocopter costs only about 150,000 marks. On slick ice, equipped with a propeller, a hydrocopter travels at well over 200 km an hour.

A few days ago near Rauma, a hydrocopter rescued a couple of numb fishermen whose boat was trapped in the ice. Aside from the armed forces coastal artillery regiments, in Finland pilots, post offices, fire departments and the border patrol have hydrocopters.



Army hydrocopters alternately compete along the ice and open water during the Lielax exercises.

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BRIEFS

FINNISH-KUWAITI ECONOMIC AGREEMENT--A Finnish-Kuwaiti agreement on economic and technological cooperation was approved at the government meeting today. The purpose of the agreement signed last December is to develop Finnish-Kuwaiti trade and economic relations. A special mixed commission will be established by the countries to supervise observance of the agreement. [Text] [LD170740 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1030 GMT 16 Jan 81 LD]

NORDIC-KENYAN COOPERATION--A development association project in the field of cooperative activities between the Nordic countries and Kenya will continue. The president of the republic today authorized the Foreign Ministry to sign, together with the other Nordic countries, an agreement with the Kenyan Government continuing the project until 1983. [Text] [LD170740 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1030 GMT 16 Jan 81 LD]

CARGO SHIPS FOR USSR--Valmet is to deliver five Arctic cargo ships to the Soviet Union. The value of the deal is nearly 200 million Finnish markka. Valmet and the Soviet export and import organization V/O Sudoimport have signed an agreement in Moscow on the delivery of five 3,000 deadweight tons general cargo ships which have been especially designed for use in the rivers of north Siberia. The vessels will be delivered in 1982-83. [Text] [LD190558 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1700 GMT 17 Jan 81 LD]

FINNISH-SOVIET PAPER AGREEMENT--Finland has concluded with the Soviet Union the biggest paper delivery agreement ever concluded between the two countries. The agreement, worth about 1.1 billion markka, was signed in Moscow today. Under the agreement the Finnish side, the Finnish paper mills' association, Finnpap, agrees to deliver to the Soviet Union about 400,000 tons of paper by the end of this year. The Soviet Union has ordered typing paper and newsprint, among other things, from Finland. [Text] [Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1400 GMT 21 Jan 81 LD]

FINNISH-MONGOLIAN SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOL--The protocol on the first meeting of the Finnish-Mongolian Scientific-Technical Cooperation Commission was signed in Helsinki today. The protocol sets out the possible spheres of cooperation between the countries as well as exchanges of experts. [Text] [Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1700 GMT 22 Jan 81 LD]

BENEFITS FROM EEC ACCESSION ANALYZED

Athens THE ATHENIAN in English Jan 81

[Article by Antony M. Economides]

[Text]

THE information services of the European Communities have already printed and circulated the new "official" colored map of the enlarged Community, showing for the first time the group's newest member, Greece (which is assigned an olive-oil green color on the map).

Greece became the EEC's tenth member as of January 1st this year. Actually, when considering the Community's statistical tables, the country is first among all members in size of merchant fleet and in percentage of working population employed in agriculture, second in birth rate, fifth in total area and in tourist revenue, seventh in population and size of labor force, eighth in total gross domestic product (GDP), ninth in population density and in percentage of unemployed, tenth in per capita GDP and energy consumption.

Accession of Greece to the European Communities is the outcome of efforts that have gone on for more than twenty years. Since 1957, the then government of Mr. Constantine Karamanlis had indicated that the creation of the Common Market was of the greatest interest to Greece. These efforts led to the conclusion of the Association Agreement, whereby Greece became the Community's first associate member as from November 1, 1962.

But political and economic reasons led the Karamanlis Government in 1975 to apply for the country's full accession to the European Communities. As Mr. Karamanlis repeatedly emphasized, Greece believes in the idea of a United Europe and wishes to play the role dictated by its historic heritage. With its organic accession to a United Europe, Greece expects to strengthen its national independence, safeguard its democratic institutions and accelerate its economic and social development.

The lengthy negotiations that followed the Greek Government's application led to the formal signing, at the Zappeion Hall in Athens on May 28, 1979, of the Treaty of Greece's Accession to the European Communities and the Act concerning the conditions of accession. Attached to the latter document were the Treaties of Paris and Rome establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. By signing these documents, Greece automatically accepted Community legislation issued to date. Both the Treaty and Act of Accession have since been ratified by the parliaments of Greece and the nine other Common Market member states.

In accordance with the Act and terms of its accession, Greece became, as of January 1st, a full and equal member of the European Communities and is now represented in all Community institutions.

Greece participates in the European Communities' Council of Ministers, in the Commission with one representative, in the European Court of Justice, in the Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank and in the Executive Committee of the Bank. Greece is also represented with 24 deputies in the European Parliament. These deputies will be directly elected in Greece sometime in 1981, but in the interim period they derive from the present composition of the Greek Parliament.

In greater detail, the Act and conditions of Greece's accession also provide for the following arrangements:

Customs Union - External Relations

Within a five-year transition period which follows the coming into force of the Accession Treaty (i.e. until December 31, 1985), there will be a gradual elimination of duties on EEC industrial products imported to Greece and an abolition of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect. At the same time, Greek customs duties on products imported from countries outside the EEC will be adjusted to the common customs tariff of the Community.

The Preferential Agreements, which the Community has signed with African and other developing countries in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the Antilles, providing for tariff concessions in favor of these countries, as well as the agreement with the countries of the European Free Trade Association, will also be progressively implemented during the transition period.

The Customs Union, upon accession, will also include steel among industrial products. In this manner, duties and obstacles in the movement

of steel products between EEC member states and Greece will be eliminated.

Import duties on Greek industrial products have already been abolished in the Common Market, by virtue of the Agreement of Association.

Capital Movement

The movement of capital, as well as payments in general between Greece and the other Community countries, will be freed gradually within the five-year transition period (i.e. until December 31, 1985).

Free repatriation of capital invested and transfer of profits abroad, for capital investments made from EEC countries from June 1975 onwards, has already come into effect as from the day of accession.

It was further agreed that, from the first year of its accession, Greece will fix the amount of foreign exchange granted to tourists visiting EEC countries at \$500 per annum (instead of the previous \$250). This amount will increase by 20% annually during the five-year transition period.

Agricultural Policy

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will apply to Greek agricultural products. Implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy to Greek agriculture has started as of accession. Alignment of prices of Greek products to those of the Community will be gradually completed in the course of the five-year transition period (except for two products - peaches and tomato pulp - for which a seven-year transition period has been set, i.e. until December 31, 1987).

The Community's aim is to secure a satisfactory income for producers, with the high prices which CAP is securing, through its various operations, to the farmers. Through CAP, a privileged and preferential regime is being created within the

Common Market, for the disposal of the Community's agricultural production, to which is now added Greek agricultural production as well. Greek agricultural products will circulate freely in the countries of the European Communities, while EEC income allotments will be granted progressively to Greek farmers in the course of the transition period.

From the first year of accession, there will be a price support policy for currants, figs and cotton as well as income allotments for olive oil.

Agricultural products of other EEC member states will also circulate freely in Greece.

In order to profit from the advantages of accession to the Common Market, Greek agriculture is adjusting its structure and overcoming certain weaknesses stemming from the small size of agricultural holdings, the quality of land and technological drawbacks. The Community assists in this sector, by its participation in the financing of agricultural restructuring programs through the European Agricultural Orientation and Guarantee Fund.

Right of Establishment

The Accession Treaty introduces substantial changes in the establishment and operation of entrepreneurial activities. By virtue of the Treaty of Rome, the right of establishment of enterprises and the promotion of their activities are free and unrestricted. There can be no discrimination between citizens of Community member states as regards nationality.

In accordance with the Community regime, every country has the right to define the conditions under which the operation of enterprises is permitted, always under the proviso that such conditions do not run counter to the Treaty of Rome and

do not imply discrimination between citizens of different Community member states. Greek citizens may thus work freely and develop their scientific and professional activities in the broader European area. It is evident that citizens of other EEC countries will have the same rights.

A three-year transition period (i.e. until December 31, 1985) was also agreed upon for implementation by Greece of Community legislation concerning the right for joining the profession of carrier by means of trucks as well as that of drivers and co-drivers. A one-year transition period (until next December 31) was agreed upon for international transports within the Community.

Social Sector

Freedom of movement of workers and employees between Greece and the Community will come into force after a seven-year transitional period (i.e. on January 1, 1988), following which Greek working people will be entitled to establish themselves and be employed freely in any Community country.

It is understood that this right, together with the industrial development and the creation of new opportunities for employment in Greece, will contribute to the gradual raising of remunerations in Greece, which will tend to reach progressively those in other Community countries.

Family allowances paid to Greeks who are employed in Community countries and whose families live in Greece will, during the first three years after accession, be similar to those paid by the Social Insurance Fund (IKA) in Greece. After the three-year period, however, family allowances thus paid will be the same as those provided under the legislation of the host Community country for citizens of other EEC countries.

Participation in the Community Budget

As from its accession, Greece will participate in the Community Budget, the Community Regional Development Fund, the Agricultural Fund (European Agricultural Orientation and Guarantee Fund), the Social Fund, etc.

Nevertheless, Greece will not transfer to the Community Budget its customs revenues on imports from EEC countries up to the time of the duties' complete elimination, neither will it transfer customs revenues on imports from countries outside the Community realized until full implementation of common customs tariff.

The progressive participation of Greece in the Third Resource of the Community Budget which will accrue from the value-added tax levy was also agreed upon (the other two resources being revenues from customs duties and compensatory

amounts which will accrue from implementation of the CAP). Inasmuch as it was agreed that Greece will introduce the value-added tax levy in the course of the three-year transitional period beginning from the day of accession, it will, in the interim period, participate in the Community Budget on the basis of a percentage of its National Income. While introducing the value-added tax levy, Greece will maintain the right to exempt certain activities from this levy, principally in the field of services, the professions and small enterprises whose annual turnover is less than 10 million units of account.

The Accession Treaty includes a protocol, in which member states recommend to the European Communities Commission (which is the competent authority taking decisions in connection with state subsidies) to take into consideration the objectives set for the economic development of Greece and the raising of the living standards of the Greek people.

G. APOSTOLATOS INTERVIEWED ON IKA HOSPITALIZATION POLICY

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 6 Dec 80 pp 10, 12

[Interview with G. Apostolatos, undersecretary of the Ministry of Social Services, date and place not given]

[Text] Mr Gerasimos Apostolatos was born in Argostoli, Cephalonia. For twenty years he was the director of the first private Public Relations organisation in Greece, and he is considered a pioneer in this field.

He has been President and an active member of several Greek and foreign organisations, including member of the Athens Municipal Council from 1964-67; President of the Ministry of Co-ordination Parliamentary Committee from 1976-77, member of the NATO Conference from 1975-77, and member of the European Parliamentary Union.

He was re-elected to Parliament in the 1977 general elections, and was given the post of Undersecretary of the Ministry of Social Services in the Social Security sector. In this position, he has made several basic changes to the sector. He is considered a reformer of the Social Security and Insurance Funds Legislation, and he has published several studies and essays.

B&F spoke to Mr Apostolatos on the subject of the hospitalisation policy of the Insurance Fund (IKA).

B&F: What is the present situation concerning the construction or establishment of hospital units in Greece?

Apostolatos: As I think is well-known, the regulations that presently exist for the construction and establishment of hospital units are time-consuming procedures, which do not allow for optimism as far as the construction of the units is concerned. However, recently enacted legislation has simplified the procedure, for the construction of three university-standard hospitals. These are to be at Ioannina, Patras, and Heraklion.

B&F: Why are these three hospitals of particular interest?

Apostolatos: The Ministry of Social Services is particularly interested in these three because they will make a considerable contribution to the level of scientific development in these areas.

B&F: What has the Ministry itself accomplished so far?

Apostolatos: The Ministry of Social Services has already called for international tenders for the construction of these hospitals. In addition, IKA, in accordance with its role of providing assistance for the insured and pensioners of Greece, has designed a large construction programme, including administrative buildings, and hospital dispensaries. The first stage of this programme includes the establishment of a hospital in Aegalea, which, like the other three in Ioannina, Patras and Heraklion, will have a capacity of 600 beds.

B&F: Is construction still in the planning stages?

Apostolatos: IKA completed the construction plans in 1977, and approval for the building was given. Both the Ministry of Social Services and a hospital consultant's office are occupied with the completion of the necessary specifications for the construction of the hospitals. The Aegaleo hospital is of special interest, because it will serve the needs of a large number of insured and pensioners from an extensive area.

B&F: Will the construction work be entirely Greek, or will foreign companies also be involved?

Apostolatos: So far, twenty-seven foreign companies have expressed an interest in the construction of this hospital. However, Greek construction companies will do the actual work, with the help of foreign specialists in the field of hospital construction. The foreign specialists will be able to offer us the most up-to-date technology and handling of matters concerning the construction and operation of the hospitals.

B&F: Which foreign companies are involved?

Apostolatos: This is as yet undecided. It is estimated that by mid-December, or January at the latest, the Committee, formed of members of the IKA Board, will make its decision as to which of the foreign firms are to offer their final proposals.

B&F: What is the cost of the project?

Apostolatos: The expenditure for the hospital is expected to be about three or four billion drachmas. It is thought that a considerable part of this will be met in foreign currency, probably through the granting of a loan by the interested government. I would like to mention that several foreign governments have expressed an interest in the construction of the first three hospitals, as well as the one IKA is building.

B&F: How soon do you think the hospital will be ready for use?

Apostolatos: It is hoped, and efforts are being directed towards this, that the hospital will be in full operation within a period of three years from the signing of the contract.

B&F: Will that be technically possible?

Apostolatos: Well the Ministry of Social Services attaches particular importance to being able to obtain the construction programmes promptly from IKA. The Ministry would like to believe that the foreign companies which will be cooperating with the Greek companies will also contribute towards this end.

B&F: Is the cooperation of the foreign companies the most important factor in this?

Apostolatos: I would like to stress again that none of these projects will be awarded exclusively to foreign firms.

The whole construction project will be carried out by Greek construction companies, with the foreign firms acting only in an advisory capacity, to offer their modern technology, and the equipment required by these hospital units.

It should also be said that design work will be done by Greek engineering firms to the greatest possible extent.

B&F: And what is IKA's broader programme?

Apostolatos: IKA's broader programme is to design a project which will cover the needs of most Greek cities, including Patras and Volos. We intend to build more hospitals in Thessaloniki and Kavala, as well as hospitals in the industrially developing area of Ptolemais. However, this is second-stage planning, for after we have met the more urgent and immediate needs of IKA.

MARXIST PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE ORGAN CRITICIZES USSR OVER POLAND

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 5 Dec 80 p 7

[Excerpts] THJODVILJINN Opens Its Eyes

THJODVILJINN'S editorial includes this comment, among others: "The situation in Poland is reminiscent in many ways of the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. East German regions bordering Poland have been closed off, and news is coming out about mobilizations in Soviet regions on the Polish border. The Kremlin rulers showed in an explicit way by invading Czechoslovakia that they will stop at nothing... And the prospects have not changed for the better since 1968. The invasion of Afghanistan is proof of that, among other things." Furthermore, THJODVILJINN quotes the former Polish minister of education as saying: "Soviet totalitarianism is as well suited for the European democratic tradition as a fist is for an eye!"

Lulling the Country to Sleep

ALTHYDUBLADID'S editorial yesterday is no less interesting than the one in THJODVILJINN. It is about the "song" of the anti-air base group: "Iceland Withdraw from NATO-Abolish the Air-Base " It goes on to say:

"It has always been easier to sing about the anti-air base group's policy than to back it up with arguments... But they have never bothered to ask this simple question: In case their wish comes true, then what? Has all danger been abolished once and for all? Has the small island nation thereby guaranteed peace and security forever?

"Iceland's military importance consists, among other things, of the fact that the defense system of Western Europe, in the event of war, is based on the mass transportation of troops from the United States to Europe. The allies would be transported by sea, which requires heavy protection. It would be the main aim of the Soviet Union to cut this life line in the event of a conflict... The world's biggest naval base is situated on the Kola Peninsula. The base includes 150 fleet-destroying nuclear submarines and 50 submarines equipped with long-range missiles. The fleet here includes aircraft carriers to guarantee protection from the air for a potential invasion into both Norway and Iceland... A country without defense that is politically isolated and has a unilateral neutrality policy is an open invitation for danger."

BRIEFS

FOREIGN LOAN DEBT INCREASE--The draft of an impending loan program calls for foreign loans of 145 billion kronur next year, approximately a 70 percent increase over this year's loan program. When the government submitted a draft of a loan program to its supporters in April, it called for 95.4 billion kronur in foreign loans, but when the loan program was formally submitted in the Althing on 3 May, it stipulated foreign loans of 85.5 billion kronur, with domestic loans totaling 53 billion kronur this year. The drafts of a loan program that the government's supporters have received call for foreign loans of up to 145 billion kronur, of which 50 billion would go to the National Powerplant for the Hrauneyjafoss Powerplant and about 30 billion for projects involving central heating installation. [Text] [Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 4 Dec 80 p 32] 8743

CSO: 3111

POLITICIANS COMMENT ON RECENT ITALIAN EEC CHAIRMANSHIP

Florence POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE in Italian Aug-Sep 80 pp 135-142

[Article: "Evaluation of a Half-Year Term: Six Months Less"]

[Text] We bring you judgments and critical comments on the recently concluded 6-month Italian EEC chairmanship. The commentators are Luciana Castellina (PDUP [Proletarian Unity Party]), Giampiero Orsello (PSDI [Italian Socialist Democratic Party]), Giuliano Silvestri (DC [Christian Democratic Party]), Roberto Viezzi (PCI), and Paolo Vittorelli (PSI [Italian Socialist Party]).

Luciana Castellina

The Italian EEC chairmanship, which has just ended, might have been described in this manner: Italy is an extraordinary country, capable of sacrificing its own national interests to insure those of European unity; its chairmanship was marvelous, being completely directed toward this noble goal. Actually, it wasn't like that. Given what the Italian government actually did during its chairmanship, it is quite true that it sacrificed Italian interests, but it is also true that it did so to favor not Europe but the United States. That is, to favor the political and social forces that benefit from maintaining a close Atlantic relationship and thereby shun any autonomous role for Europe.

Let's look at the facts. Especially the so-called great success of Italian diplomacy. Strong in his capacity as a mediator (how to deny that the Christian Democratic tradition is unsurpassable in this area?), it brought home the compromise with England, where others had failed. Savior of European unity, then? Not really. I would say, rather, that the Italian government meekly agreed to pay a higher price for this compromise by meeting Mrs Thatcher's demands and giving up on a different and better use of resources. These are now flowing into English coffers, though they are intended to reestablish equality between regions, especially between our South and the rest of the Community. A sacrifice not dictated by generosity (indeed!) but by larger political interests: to support the main pro-American pole in Europe, the British Conservative government, and offset the willful "third force" of Germany and France. Toadying up to Washington, to put it bluntly.

Even in this initiative the facts have shown that the chairmanship of Europe matters rather little to the Italian government, because perpetuating mechanisms that leave

Italy on the sidelines (giving in to England, agreeing to limit at present ceilings any increase in the EEC's resources, which are nearly exhausted) only means postponing any serious EEC policy of economic convergence. This not only harms Italy but also weakens Europe, which can play an independent role only if it is less unequal than it is now. Also in these 6 months, the chairmanship proceeded according to the same logic that brought about Italy's uncritical participation in the EMS [European Monetary System], favoring a formal rather than a substantial unity, thereby increasing excesses and strengthening the mechanisms that make the rich richer and consolidate inequalities. But here the fault is, frankly, not the government's alone. The two major parties of the left, which, as we know, expressed doubts when Italy joined the EMS (particularly the PCI, which came out squarely against it at the time), decided to swing to the right when the debate in the Strasbourg parliament bogged down over the evaluation of the EMS's first year. They thus lost the chance to bring the problem up again with some emphasis, and as we know, Italy had more than one dramatic point to make.

Finally, let us consider the EEC's international policy: Iran, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the North-South dialogue.

Let's begin with Iran. The chairmanship's point of view was clear: agree with Carter at all costs. In this case, the costs were not only economic but political: support the boycott in solidarity with the United States even when Bani-Sadr seemed to be succeeding in bringing about a reasonable solution to the issue of the hostages; the only result of this support was to make such a solution impossible, reinvigorate the Iranian fundamentalists, and increase that country's difficulties so that it might find advantage in an irresponsible strategy: "the worse, the better." This is the adventurist policy that Washington has followed in trying to undo the Iranian revolution.

Afghanistan and, more generally, relations with the USSR. The dynamic role played by Schmidt and Giscard (whatever the limits and ambiguities of this policy) and Italy's stubborn faithfulness to the Atlantic alliance are too well known to waste words denouncing the action of our EEC chairmanship.

As for the Middle East, the document voted at the summit meeting of the Nine in Venice is not "null and void," as the French communists hastily termed it in the European parliament. Yet how can anyone not denounce or say how limited, how practically ineffective, especially, the position is that was taken in Venice. True, it does quote the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and yet at the same time says it is necessary to follow the way opened up at Camp David, when this way is not only blocked but intended from the beginning to put the PLO on the margin of any negotiations. (And here the Italian government's role is evident: it is the government's position; although in this country public opinion may be more favorable to the Palestinian cause, it is among all European governments the most close-minded on the official diplomatic level.)

And it is not just a matter of taking a clearer documentary stand. The Middle East problem is an integral part of North-South relations; it is like a test stand for a European policy that is not limited to giving lip service to that book of good intentions called the Brandt Report, which is contradicted at every turn by the practical choices made by individual governments and the EEC in general in their relations with both the Third World directly and various international organizations (UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization], UNCTAD, etc.). In this case the accusation cannot be

made solely against the Italian government, because the others, including the more "autonomous" French and German governments are as much and even more stingy and short-sighted. They want better relations, but they are always hostile to discussing the mechanisms that perpetuate neocolonial dependency.

Therefore it is quite illusory to think an independent Europe can find its role without tying into the group of non-aligned countries, which can be considered an alternate development model for the EEC and capable of removing the Third World from the blackmail that it is being subjected to by the games of the great powers.

Giampiero Orsello

The Italian term as chairman of the EEC Council of Ministers has passed quickly, and now, on 1 July, the chairmanship goes to Luxemburg. Frankly, one might say that the legacy of the preceding term will not weigh heavily on the work of Luxemburg Foreign Affairs Minister Gaston Thorn, who will be the next chairman of the Brussels Commission. Chairman Thorn will then have to wrestle with existing difficulties and the unsolved problems of the present Jenkins Commission, which has lately had to deal with the precarious balance of the British situation and its captious disposition toward the EEC and with the political failure to find an adequate role for the Commission, especially since the election of the European Parliament.

This is not the time to evaluate completely the experience of the Brussels Commission; its mandate has not yet expired. But it certainly is appropriate to consider how Italy has used the opportunity that every 5 years lets each EEC country take on major responsibility in leading the EEC Council of Ministers.

We should say first of all that, as often happens, we are in the habit of expecting too much of the part Italy plays in Europe and the international situation, so that it is easy for hope--and, sometimes, illusions--to be replaced by disillusionment and frustration. At the end of 1979, then, the Italian chairmanship of the Council of Ministers (and, subsequently, of the European Council in Venice) was seen as a great chance for Italy to play an important part in Europe, one quite disproportionate to the influence it actually exerts and in clear contrast to the problems of the domestic political and economic situation.

Having said all this, we certainly cannot say we can behold, if not with satisfaction at least with a clear conscience, the way in which the chance was not only not used to the benefit of the Community (the national aspect interests us less) but was not used as it might have been, limiting ourselves as we did to accepting with excessive complacency compliments on good organizing and on the hospitality shown in preparing and conducting the regular meetings of heads of state and government that took place in Venice during our chairmanship. We should add as an extenuating circumstance that an involuntary but quite prolonged shuffling of ministers in the Farnesina office in such a short period of time had never been seen before, and we are convinced that if Emilio Colombo had been there longer, the result would have been different and better for the prestige of both the EEC and our foreign ministry. This would have happened if Minister Malfatti had not been forced to resign at the beginning of the year; Malfatti was already chairman of the Brussels Commission.

Minister Emilio Colombo registered not a few personal successes in his term as chairman, certainly more for his recognized capacity as a mediator and long acquaintance with EEC mechanisms than for his quality as foreign minister of the Italian Republic;

it was for his personal qualities that the European parliament, which is certainly not lavish with praise--and rightly so--in the meeting with the EEC Council of Ministers greeted him with long, deserved applause when he entered the assembly hall. Colombo distinguished himself by solving the serious problem of the British attitude to the EEC, an attitude that had even undermined its existence above and beyond the "return" demands, however justified they may have been. Similarly, he succeeded in very difficult negotiations in removing the impasse that had occurred as a consequence of the EEC budget failure. This failure followed a decision of the European parliament that was considered historic at the time not only for the specific aspects of the resolution adopted on 13 December 1979 but also for the act of political will shown by the European parliament, strengthened as it was by the people's will expressed in universal suffrage. However, it should be emphasized that the decision adopted at the conclusion of a long debate reminds us of the mountain that gave birth to a mouse. Also concerning the Community's attitude toward the Mideast crisis and toward the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the work of Emilio Colombo appears inspired with realism and wisdom, both when it came to expressing the Nine's point of view on the Iranian situation and when an uneasy balance had to be reached between the positions of some European countries and U.S. diplomacy in its confrontation of the Soviet move. Minister Colombo has not been criticized in these confrontations; everyone seems to find his deportment valid and, under the circumstances, meritorious, even people of differing opinions. What is in question is the Italian initiative in the European context and the international situation.

The Italian chairmanship was not brilliant and showed little awareness of this country's European role. Statements of principle and manifestations of good will were not followed up by concrete and timely actions. We sympathize with the "consolation" policy of Giscard and Schmidt, but we do not work consistently to be present in a European initiative that is both useful and necessary, especially in the difficult international situation where Europe must play a triple role: that of strengthening itself internally (which is seen variously as supporting the short-sighted zealots of nefarious autarchic and corporative interests and as enlarging the EEC to include southern Mediterranean countries); that of establishing a more egalitarian relationship with the United States (but at the recent meeting, Italy played the card of member of a bilateral relationship more than the other, more valid cards of greater concern for European vocation); and that of maintaining a dialectical dialogue with the USSR, despite the growing difficulty of the Mideast crisis and the Afghan invasion (however, Italy rested equivocally on the few laurels of the Olympic boycott, showing by reverse example that in the crisis of bipolarism Europe, though part of the Atlantic alliance, can and ought to have increased influence in international affairs if it wants to be useful to itself and also make a valid contribution to the policy of the whole Western world).

As can be seen, there has been and is a lot of room for European initiative, though not in the manner of France and Germany, which have been striving now more than ever to fill a power vacuum with a choice that is fair but that has the serious limitation and obvious defect of not being European. Moreover, the Community languishes with a European parliament that is manfully striving to carve out a place for itself, a Council of Ministers that is being increasingly appropriated by national leaders and affected by the technicalism of the COREPER [Permanent Representative Committee], and a Commission that has not yet managed to take the Community beyond a customs union to a real economic and monetary union. This eventual union would be governed by the treaties, and by a market economy, but it would be able to achieve "harmonious unity," as indicated in the treaties, by overcoming social, sectorial and territorial inequities as only a

policy of economic planning can, with a gradual movement of wealth from the North to the South and with a more substantial and active relationship with the areas of the Third and Fourth Worlds.

All this could and ought to have been at the center of Italian initiative in the 6 months just passed. It is an agenda that can be transferred to Luxemburg, but without a shadow of pretentiousness can we expect Luxemburg to win a game that Italy did not even try to play?

For our part, it would be opportune to accept the challenge recently made by the president of the European parliament to "rethink the very concept of Europe" with the necessary decision, when the way is open, to make a supranational Europe in real terms, a future federation.

Giuliano Silvestri

The judgment on the Italian EEC chairmanship cannot fail to be many-sided and, for a number of reasons, very complex. Besides, the train of events in Europe (both in and outside of the Community) has been rather contradictory or at least very uneven in the last 6 months. Troughs of pessimism have been followed by phases of pronounced optimism.

Without fear of contradiction we may say that when Italy took over the chairmanship it inherited accumulated problems of no little import. English quarreling over the budget, the European Parliament's negative vote contrasting sharply with the Executive Commission, an international situation still burning from the capture of the American hostages in Iran, not to mention the brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A number of problems undoubtedly worthy of a strongly active, courageous chairmanship. But Italy came to the position under the worst possible conditions: a state of political crisis, which lasted till the eve of administrative consultations (also strongly politicized) and left a power vacuum for so long that there was thought of possible procedural maneuvers aimed at boycotting the two Venice summits (these accusations were raised especially in the case of the DC, though not by the Christian Democratic rank and file).

The negative judgment usually made about the first phase of the Italian chairmanship is therefore obvious. There are not enough, sure, consistent results to make a positive judgment possible: agreement among the Nine to renew collaboration in education; agreements to promote greater homogeneity among the legal systems; the beginnings of a more effective struggle against crime and, especially, terrorism; agreements to start new forms of collaboration in the struggle against unemployment and for workers' protection; and agreements to lay the foundations for a Community fishing policy. These are achievements, though they are not all that could have been done. And at most they would seem to make possible technical and administrative adjustments that still pale in comparison to the political and diplomatic possibilities that the Old World could and still can exploit.

Moreover, the basic question is the traditional one: is there political room for Europe to take the initiative in an international context that still looks anxiously upon any appreciable change in the power balance between the opposing blocs? Do the EEC countries actually have the possibility of operating with some autonomy between the great powers without breaking the ties of the Atlantic alliance, the now famous "choosing of sides?" Frankly, it must be said that the general situation did not

help much those who wanted a European activist role. American hostages in Tehran, the invasion of Afghanistan, the electoral climate in the United States with obvious hardening effects on any international controversy (the Olympic boycott, economic sanctions in the confrontation with Iran), Jewish lobby pressure on the American candidates for the White House so that no concrete steps would be taken toward solving the central problem of the Mideast crisis, the plight of the Palestinians.

In this situation, then, any action on the part of the chairman that did not display enthusiasm or take courageous initiative would inevitably be a failure on all accounts.

In all honesty, the first months of Italian leadership of Europe were not such as to satisfy those people, European or not (we are thinking of the Arab countries, who had trustingly awaited this country's chairmanship, aware of the merits acquired by illustrious Italians in less suspicious times, when the cause of the Arab peoples was to defend themselves against colonialism rather than solve the energy crisis; some names quickly come to mind: La Pira, Mattei, Lelio Basso, Aldo Moro) who thought that it was in order for this country to take firm action in the Mideast crisis, to renew the process of detente and disarmament in the face of events in Afghanistan, a brutal move that was obviously part of a new Soviet expansionist policy. Diplomatic activity was swimming upstream throughout the Italian turn in the chairmanship; economic sanctions were invoked in the confrontation with Iran, but not to the rigid extent desired by the United States, and the Olympics were boycotted, but not with the absolute rigidity claimed by our major allies.

And from this viewpoint it should be observed that the most faithful allies (Thatcher's British) ended up farthest from the American position, both in the case of the sanctions against Iran and in the Olympic boycott. Actually, England did not take the slightest retaliatory measures and was clearly swayed by the position of the City of London concerning economic relations and by British athletes concerning the Olympics.

Rather, the firmest positions were taken by the Federal Republic of Chancellor Schmidt, who took strong positions on the Olympics and Iran but also worked hard to restart detente (and disarmament) talks with Moscow despite some noisy quarrels with Carter that broke out on the eve of his trip to the Soviet Union.

In these cases, too, the Italian chairmanship appeared rather irrelevant and, in any event, incapable of using whatever space it had for an initiative that might have improved matters without renouncing its collegial ties with the United States. The final phase of the Italian chairmanship shows that this was not a deliberate position on our part, as some, or even many, have insisted. The objective was achieved of limiting the dispute between England and the EEC, and Italy was able to sign and shape the Venice declaration on the problem of Afghanistan and the Middle East. This despite the hysterical reaction of Begin and hard pressure from the American administration. Thus, from this standpoint, Colombo's quick trip to Washington on the eve of the conference appears to have been due to arm-twisting by the great power, which was showing all its displeasure at an action insufficiently coordinated between partners.

We recall the widespread pessimism after the Colombo mission. Actually, the results were quite different. True, they were substantially behind the development and maturation of events, but they did come about rather more quickly relative to preceding positions. Just think: the obvious request to bring together all the parties in the dispute (and, therefore, the Palestinians, too) for peace negotiations and a general solution with the logically consistent recognition of the role and function of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Of course, such statements of principle would yield

very few results unless they were acted upon (UN initiative to supersede resolution No 242, and diplomatic recognition of the PLO); there remains, in any case, the noteworthy pronouncement made in a situation of great difficulty (reaction of Israel and pressure from Carter). It was a leap in quality, therefore, fitting for the end of the Italian chairmanship: the end of the dispute with England and the Venice declaration.

As we were saying earlier, this action confirms that room for a particularly European initiative did and does exist, but it is to be regretted that this route was not followed completely and courageously in other aspects of the international situation (e.g. the disarmament problem and renewing detente).

If we had to define our experience of these months, we would not go much farther than "satisfying but not ecstatic." Initial elation was followed finally by a good send-off (and to the positive results we would also add the choice of the future chairman of the Commission, Luxemburg's Gaston Thorn, who was blocked by the open hostility of France until Colombo mediated the matter). One lesson we do retain from this experience: the interests of the Western alliance are not always served by bowing down to the positions of the United States, especially the most absurd and mistaken ones. From this viewpoint, then, it can be said that that just serves the same aggressiveness and policy of force of the Soviet Union.

Roberto Viezzi

Italy's 6-month chairmanship of the EEC has concluded with two achievements that have caused many people to term the chairmanship a success: the compromise on the British problem and the approval of the 1980 Community budget. Without depreciating these two aspects, which made it possible to overcome an impasse in which the Community would have run serious risks of falling apart, it is opportune to think a little more deeply not only about Italy's term of office but also more generally about how Italy stands in the EEC. Before going into that, however, it is not inopportune to recall that Italy's chairmanship was marked by the presence of two governmental formations. Under the first, the chairmanship was particularly weak, flaccid, and distracted, and the conclusion was the bankruptcy of the European Council of Luxemburg. In the second part, Foreign Minister Colombo, drawing on his experience in the EEC, was able to impart a kind of dynamism to the chairmanship, which helped achieve the aforementioned results.

But the evaluation cannot stop there. It is especially not enough to say that the two problems that had been open have been closed; it is also necessary to see how they were settled. The British issue was resolved by giving Great Britain almost everything it wanted. Not only that, but the British requests, which had begun as a request for equalization of Community policies, rapidly turned into a mere financial aid application to cover its debts to the Community. Thus was "officially" introduced the practice of "just return" in intracommunity relations, which established a precedent that will not fail to have repercussions in the EEC's future development. But that's not all. Not only Great Britain but Italy was the originator of the battle for "convergence" of Community policies. Italy's motivation was based on inequalities caused by Community policies, particularly agricultural ones, and requests were made for equalization. But as time went by, this position became blurred and finally

disappeared entirely, leaving the field open to the "English question," which wrongly became synonymous with "convergence" in recent months.

What seemed to be the major innovation in the political community, i.e. the call for complete change in existing policies and concrete action for a new equilibrium (which grew out of a vast consensus between the main Italian political forces) has vanished. Why? Because of weakness in negotiating or because we were scared off when the Commission served notice that Italy's accounts were in arrears to the Community, though only a little. The fact is that Italy has found itself without an effective policy in the Community in recent months, a policy that would allow it to develop a role more incisive than simply mediating between litigious parties or having to line up with someone else's position. We realize it is not easy to define and sustain a position that would defend Italy's interests effectively in the Community. Italy certainly cannot act like Great Britain, and it must also deal with the French-German tandem. The problem cannot be settled with some old chestnuts or general criticism of the government; it concerns all Italian political forces.

Having said this, though, the difference between a complex problem and a defeatist attitude is great. In fact, the Italian government has vacillated recently between niggling demands concentrated mainly in agriculture and a general and rather inconclusive Europeanistic rhetoric. To be accurate, this is not to disparage the claims in themselves. Thus, the concessions that Minister Marcora obtained in his capacity as a negotiator have made it possible to adjust our accounts with the Community. But when these demands are set up as concrete examples against the idea of Community agricultural policy in the abstract, then things don't work out, and this country again assumes a kind of subordinate presence in the EEC.

A similar argument can be made concerning the 1980 Community budget. Here too, it is praiseworthy that the activism of the Italian presence enabled the budget to be approved, thus preventing the EEC from becoming insolvent. But there is a legitimate question: What kind of budget has been passed? It is a worse budget than the one rejected by the European parliament in December 1979. Some 74 percent of it goes to agriculture. This is the consequence of the agreement to fix agricultural prices for 1980-81, an agreement that makes no serious provision for controlling surpluses, which are still piling up in some sectors. Here too, then, a chance was lost to fight to reform a policy that many now recognize as being contradictory and, in some aspects, untenable. Activism does not make up for a lack of political initiative.

The Italian term in the chairmanship is over. The chairman has no mythical powers; when he goes, the problems remain. And they are pressing problems: a Community that has nearly exhausted its own resources; increasingly pronounced symptoms of disunity among the Nine; and policies that no longer apply. Some parties are even beginning to think of changing the basic structure and institutions of the EEC. And Italy? To avoid being caught by surprise by others' initiatives, which may even run counter to strengthening and reintegrating the Community, this country would need a renewal, and we would have behind us the consensus of the great democratic forces. If, on the other hand, people want to go the route of the "preamblists," that of using foreign policy as a means of propaganda and domestic division, they will soon see the consequences, and they won't be good.

At the beginning of the Italian term in the chairmanship of the EEC, we expressed a hope that it might make it possible for the government to take relevant initiatives in international relations. However, a governmental crisis brought about a change in the foreign ministry and partly paralyzed any noteworthy Italian initiative. Moreover, the crisis in relations between England and the EEC kept the Italian chairman so busy resolving the conflict that he could concern himself with little else. Thus, a good chance was lost to put Italian foreign policy in a better light at a rather critical moment for detente in Europe and the world.

However, room for European action was and is still there. This is due in part to the impressive power vacuum left by the American election campaign, which will continue till early November of this year. If it results in the election of a new president, this vacuum will be prolonged not only until a new administration is installed, about 2 months thence, but for some months afterwards, till the breaking-in period is over. In this half light, then, a few more months without the full weight of a clear American initiative may be painfully felt. This power vacuum in the superpower that heads the Atlantic alliance coincides with the Soviet move in Afghanistan, the first intervention of its kind since the years in which Europe was divided up: a military action that has been met with only a fragmentary and disorganized response that has not measured up to the profound significance that this move might have; the occupation of Afghanistan may mean that a process has begun whereby Asia will be partitioned along ideological bloc lines, which the rationale of non-aligned resistance is beginning hesitantly to oppose.

This latter rationale has emerged only under the sign of Islamic solidarity, which cannot claim to be exclusively representative of all the non-aligned nations, although it does constitute a nucleus. It is heterogeneous but not devoid of unity of a sort: the EEC has appealed to this unity in one of its few united initiatives in this period. Italy does not seem to have contributed much to this initiative, when it comes to the Palestinian issue.

Europe, and particularly Italy, have a primary interest in the non-aligned countries because the territory so chaotically covered by this international position constitutes in many cases a buffer that prevents a direct confrontation or "collision," as it is often put, between the two world military blocs. Not to mention the economic interest that Europe has in Japan and in the group of non-aligned countries that produce oil and raw materials.

Except for Italy's diplomatic activity in settling Britain's dispute with the EEC, it cannot be said that any other initiative was taken during the Italian chairmanship: not in European relations; not in Europe-U.S. relations; not in East-West relations; nor in North-South relations, particularly as they affect Europe.

Let us look first of all at European relations. Maybe nothing much could be done but salvage what could be salvaged for the further development of a policy of European unity. But there was room for improvement. And where it is not occupied collegially by Europe, it is occupied by each of its separate components, either singly or in groups of limited power. Rather than what might have been done in this area, let us look instead at what has been partially done. The meeting in Germany between Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing, especially in the French president's declarations, shows that a defense gap is emerging in western Europe; the United States cannot fill it, and

it will probably cause Europe, in the next decade, to consider having more autonomy in its own security, with both military and diplomatic means.

This defense gap opens up a series of problems between Europe and the United States, and they extend even beyond the confines of the "Atlantic" alliance. NATO's decision last December to base Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe in the next 3 years constitutes a partial solution to this problem, but it cannot be met only in military terms. What is in crisis is the credibility of the whole strategy of "elastic defense," which was adopted by NATO in 1967; it is the credibility of an effective American atomic cover of western Europe in case flexible response goes over the nuclear threshold.

Precisely because Western military response to growing Soviet military power appears indecisive and lacks credibility, an opening has been made in East-West relations in general. American security remains assured by the balance in intercontinental weapons, but Europe's is rather less so, for it has become aware of NATO's strategic concepts for the European continent and has posed itself the problem of autonomous security. Some European countries have rejected having new missiles on their territory, and others have had direct meetings with the Soviet Union to open the way to a balanced reduction of theater missiles on this continent.

More steps have been taken in relations between Europe and the Arab countries, but these have been limited to a declaration of principle without developing EEC initiatives in the whole scenario of relations between the EEC and the oil-producing countries. Even the Arab countries have the impression that Europe is divided into nine sovereign and distinct states and that only bilateral relations are useful, especially in economic matters.

These considerations are not meant as a reproof to the two Cossiga cabinets that succeeded one another during the Italian chairmanship of the EEC. Only with great distortion can that chairmanship be made to look like effective political leadership of the Community, and none of the excessively sovereign nations belonging to the EEC has ever been disposed to yield to another. This is meant, rather, to point to a series of openings that have been occupied, not only for their political and economic importance, not by the EEC in general but by the two major powers of the Community, namely the German Federal Republic and France.

These two powers were not bothered by any ministerial crisis in that period, but they might have undergone other and no less relevant internal upheavals, such as the early elections in Germany and the presidential elections in France. But they continued to play politics by trying to fill in the first of the two "empty" 6-month periods caused by the forthcoming American presidential election. It is a lesson in methods, which this country might have found useful by better using its chairmanship of the European Community.

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CONSERVATIVES PASS LABOR LESS THAN 1 YEAR BEFORE ELECTIONS

Conservatives Lead for First Time

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Dec 80 p 3

[Excerpts] The Conservatives have outstripped the Labor Party! That is the historic news of the November Gallup poll and the figures are 31.2 percent for the Conservatives and 30.9 percent for the government party which has declined another 2.3 percent since October. The Conservative Party chairman, Storting representative Jo Benkow, told AFTENPOSTEN that the party has publicized its positions--everyone knows where the Conservatives stand. The chairman of the Labor Party, cabinet member Reulf Steen, maintained that the figures do not express the true mood of the voters.

The Labor Party has been clearly ahead of the Conservatives in real strength since the 1930's--and has also held a good lead until recent years in the public opinion polls ever since they were first introduced in Norway in the late 1940's.

The new sharp decline for the Labor Party--while the Conservatives registered a barely measurable advance since October--is the most notable aspect of Norwegian Market Data's November political opinion poll (the field work was done at the end of November and the beginning of this month). The other big changes were gains for the peripheral parties, the Socialist-Left and the Progressives, who gained 1 and 1.2 percent respectively.

The barometer shows that as a group the socialist parties have the support of only 39 percent of the voters. The three biggest nonsocialist parties, the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, mustered the support of 50.4 percent.

Conservative chairman Jo Benkow said in a comment to AFTENPOSTEN: "We have made a strong effort to publicize our issues and viewpoints and everyone knows where the Conservatives stand. In my opinion that is the reason why the party can show a steady rise and a stabilization at over 30 percent of the support in recent months.

"It has become quite difficult to know where the Labor Party stands on individual issues," Benkow continued. "This, along with the internal party conflict, led

to a record low in support for the government party. The government must also shoulder most of the blame for the flight from the Labor Party since they have chosen discussion over leadership in their handling of important matters."

The Conservative chairman naturally did not conceal his joy that for the first time his party had passed the Labor Party in a political opinion poll. But Benkow pointed out that 33 public opinion polls are released each year and the current one is valid only until the next one is taken.

"Actually I don't think our gain will last very long," said Benkow, "but we are naturally very satisfied with the fact that the party has a much stronger position than it had in the 1977 election and that the Labor Party appears to have become correspondingly weaker.

"There is also good reason to rejoice in the fact that the three cooperating parties, the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, have the support of around 50 percent of the people," said Benkow, "and thus the latest opinion poll provides the best working basis for the 9 months remaining before the Storting election."

Reulf Steen told AFTENPOSTEN over the phone from "Kronprins Harald":

"As far as the Labor Party is concerned the new figures confirm the opinion polls released earlier in the month. Most of the information for the poll was collected before our national committee meeting in Hamar on 1 and 2 December and that was a very difficult time for the Labor Party.

"However I am convinced that the Hamar meeting was the starting signal for a unification of the party and I think the bottom has been reached as far as we're concerned," Steen insisted. "There is no reason to conceal the fact that the discussion on stockpiling and the so-called personality conflict made a negative impression on some of our voters. The debate on next year's national budget could also have had a negative effect on the support noted at this time but I have no doubt that we will be able to regain what we have lost and then some before the Storting election next fall."

Steen refused to comment on whether he personally might be one of the reasons for the decline noted for the Labor Party nor would he say whether such a low voter support figure would have any effect on his position as party chairman and on the next national congress next year.

"It is an optical illusion to say that the Conservatives have passed us," Steen maintained. "This does not express the opinions prevailing among the voting public," said the chairman of the Labor Party.

Gallup's Political Barometer

The barometer was produced by weighing each party against the 1977 Storting election. Calculated statistical error can be 3 percent for voting percentages near 50 percent, around 2 percent for voting percentages of 10-20 percent and around 1 percent for lower voting percentages.

Interviews were conducted in the period from 15 November to 5 December 1980. All responses expressed in percentages.

	Sep 1977*	Aug 1979	Sep 1979**	Dec 1979	Mar 1980	Aug 1980	Oct 1980	Nov 1980
Radical Liberals	0.6	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9
Labor	42.3	37.1	36.2	37.2	35.8	37.5	33.2	30.9
Norwegian CP	0.4	0.4	--	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5
Socialist-Left	4.2	4.7	4.4	4.8	4.7	4.8	5.7	6.7
	47.5	43.0	41.4	43.5	42.1	43.5	40.2	39.0
Progressives	1.9	1.2	2.5	3.9	3.9	3.3	2.7	3.9
DLF [expansion unknown]	1.4	1.2	1.2	0.8	1.5	0.9	0.4	0.9
Conservatives	24.8	30.2	29.7	27.8	28.7	27.1	31.1	31.2
Christ. People's	12.4	11.7	10.1	11.0	11.0	11.4	12.7	12.4
Center	8.6	7.9	8.6	8.1	7.5	8.3	6.8	6.8
Liberals	3.2	4.3	5.3	4.6	5.2	5.2	5.7	5.5
Others	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3
Total	100.1	100.0	99.4	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Reply on party preference		1225		1146	1087	1163	1124	1165
Total number interviewed		1571		1380	1322	1420	1454	1467

*Storting election

**County council election

Oslo, 19 December 1980

Norwegian Market Data, Inc.

Nordli Admits Open Divisions

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by Eivind G. Karlsen]

[Text] Political erosion--as a result of government responsibility from a minority position in the 1960's and 1970's. Prime Minister Odvar Nordli suggested this yesterday as a partial explanation for the Labor Party's clear decline, a long-lasting slide in support that brought the government party behind the Conservatives in the latest political opinion poll. Nordli ought to know what he's talking about--he is leading the third Labor minority government just since 1971 and on 15 January it will be 5 years since he became chief of state.

In 1981, as the prime minister pointed out at his press conference yesterday, it will be 20 years since the Labor Party has had a majority in Storting--since then it has simply had enough political strength to push measures through. The non-socialist coalition government under Per Borten from 1965 to 1971 is the only majority government we have had since 1961. And for the last 9 years what used to be our biggest party has led the nation through the minority governments of Trygve Bratteli and Odvar Nordli, interrupted only by Lars Korvald's "mini-coalition" in 1972-73.

It is obvious that this has had an erosive effect on the Labor Party--as it would have had on any other party in the same situation. Even so, Nordli said he was convinced that it was right for the party to hold onto the opportunities provided by government responsibility to influence political developments. Few would disagree with that evaluation. That is not the case when it comes to judging how the initiative and the opportunities were handled, especially in recent years.

The prime minister is right when he says that in many ways we are living in a new era: class society is something belonging to academic discussions at Blindern, a welfare state has been constructed and the Labor Party can take part of the credit for that. In a way the Social Democrats are "running into" the long-term effects of their own policies. In addition they and their political competitors are confronted with new problems connected with resources and the environment, among other things, as well as the worst economic crisis in the western world in 50 years. And an organizational society has emerged--partly in the name of democracy--which takes its share of material goods and welfare while exerting greater influence.

Some of the problems have been eased by the fact that Norway has become an oil nation. But this does not apply to administrative problems which have become more tangible than ever. The prime minister's own philosophy has been to confront the larger organizations head-on in order to create a dialogue and also an understanding of the problems that concern society as a whole. Of course the government must have standpoints of its own but it should also listen to those of others, Nordli said.

No intelligent democratically-oriented person would disagree with that. But if one looks at the situation of the Labor Party today--and its political leadership should be present in the Nordli cabinet--some questions are unavoidable. Haven't they neglected to a large extent the major task in a complex society of guiding and leading, showing the way with regard to organizations as well as public opinion? Haven't they hesitated too much, led too little--and acted on matters that should have been postponed?

There are examples of all this. For although the prime minister's own political instincts and attitudes are good enough, by and large, they have not led to results--or subsequent "dividends" for the Labor Party. In his program speech some 5 years ago Nordli warmly advocated some dismantling of the bureaucracy and in particular limitations on progressive taxes. Nothing will be done about the taxes before 1981. In the NATO modernization plans last year and the stockpiling issue this year the prime minister and the government waited much too long to make

their views known. Last fall Nordli did not put things in place--with regard to our NATO ties--before the danger of destructive party conflicts on the matter was imminent. The Alta issue has also been lying in limbo to the detriment of popular rule.

Poll: Dissatisfaction With Government

Oslo APTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by Erling Koldaas]

[Text] The only issue on which the government received good marks in a public opinion poll conducted for APTENPOSTEN by the Norwegian Institute of Public Opinion concerned the use of arbitration to deal with illegal strikes. With regard to the Alta issue, stockpiling of military materiel, student loan opportunities and taxes most of those asked said the government had handled these matters very poorly or quite poorly.

About 1000 people were asked this question: "Do you feel the government has handled the following issues very well, quite well, quite poorly or very poorly?" Then the subjects were presented with the issues involved in the survey.

With regard to its handling of illegal strikes, the government was marked as having acted very well or quite well by a majority of those asked, with 49 percent having that concept of the government's actions in this area, while 40 percent said they were dissatisfied.

The government's handling of the Alta issue was characterized as quite poor by 34 percent of the population and very poor by 26 percent. Only in its own party did the government get support for its line. The attitudes were expressed as follows:

	Very well	Quite well	Quite poorly	Very poorly	Don't know
Total	6	27	34	26	7
Labor	11	42	27	14	6
Conservatives	5	24	38	29	4
Christian People's Party		30	44	14	12
Socialist-Left	3	10	24	59	4
Liberals	5	20	33	37	5
Center	1	22	41	36	
Others	10	8	37	30	18

The government's handling of taxes was backed by only 35 percent if we add together the "very well" and "quite well" responses. Negative marks were given by 57 percent and on this issue it is only by a scant margin that the Labor Party's own

voters back their government. When asked, 51 percent of Labor voters replied that they were satisfied with the handling of these matters while 44 percent held a different opinion. In all the other parties there is widespread dissatisfaction, most notably in the Center Party with 69 percent.

And when it came to the stockpiling of heavy military materiel and student loan opportunities, a majority of those asked used the categories "quite poorly" or "very poorly" to describe the government's performance by 53 and 54 percent respectively. This is how the answers to these questions were divided up according to the political sympathies of those interviewed.

	Very well	Quite well	Quite poorly	Very poorly	Don't know
Stockpiling of heavy materiel:					
Total	6	33	35	18	8
Labor	10	44	29	10	7
Conservatives	7	38	37	14	4
Christian People's Party	6	23	35	21	15
Socialist-Left	2	11	41	41	6
Liberals	3	29	43	25	
Center		35	51	13	2
Others	2	24	35	25	14

Student loan opportunities:

Total	9	29	30	24	7
Labor	16	39	23	14	7
Conservatives	5	27	38	25	6
Christian People's Party	4	30	36	18	12
Socialist-Left	3	13	41	38	6
Liberals	3	26	41	29	2
Center	6	28	36	29	2
Others	14	29	19	32	6

Stockpiling, Economy Worry Voters

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by Egil Sundar]

[Text] Nine months before the Storting election, the tide is running in favor of the nonsocialist parties. The conservative wave that is sweeping over large parts of the western world is creating expectations that domestic politics in 1981

will again lead to a nonsocialist majority in Storting and a government to match. In leading Labor Party circles people are starting to adjust to the idea that the Nordli government's days are numbered. And if this assumption proves to be correct, which most political observers consider probable, we will be able to gather around the radio or TV a year from now to hear Prime Minister Kare Willoch's New Year's address to the Norwegian people.

Opinion polls conducted by three different institutes over a period of some time provide a good basis for the hypothesis of a nonsocialist election victory in September. A marked and dramatic decline for the Labor Party and a gain over a broad front for the Conservatives, a trend that has made the two major political opponents about equal in strength, indicate a deep distrust about the current regime's handling of national problems. This distrust is based on several factors, not all of them solely related to the present political situation, in fact they must undoubtedly also be ascribed to more fundamental social and sociological conditions. Above all we are witnessing a shift away from a socialist reform policy that is not rooted in or attached to the desires and needs of the majority of the voters. Let us not forget that we have acquired a new generation of voters who were shaped by the modern prosperous welfare state with no personal knowledge of social conditions in Norway in the 1920's and 1930's. Today the "class society" exists only in academic discussions at Blindern.

In one area after another the Labor Party has been incapable of adjusting its policies to the reality of our own period, to a fundamentally new situation. To an increasing extent the party has fallen out of step with its voters, especially the young people of today who are seeking for something that will give meaning to life, a message that will provide faith in the future.

Despite all verbal and program plank assurances that democratic socialism is a freedom movement more and more people are realizing that society is developing in opposition to the principle of individual freedom, the right of the individual to fulfill himself and shape his own future. As a result of socialist legislative policies Norway is heading in a direction that threatens the rights and freedoms of the individual. Via legislation the state interferes in people's daily life, even trivial details and individual issues are meddled with. This kind of thing restricts the right of the individual to make his own decisions, his right to make choices about himself and his own life. From birth to death everything is regulated by the omnipotent state, for the Labor Party's eagerness to regulate and control is unlimited.

A swollen bureaucratic state power is a function of this policy. And--note this well--we are talking about a bureaucracy without moderation for the network of regulations and decisions with which we are being buried will only become stronger and tighter for each year the socialist "freedom movement" remains in power.

Another result of the democratic socialism as practiced by the Labor Party is a tax policy which for a number of years has checked initiative and promoted inflation, making extra effort unprofitable and placing all kinds of checks and

restraints on the creation of new enterprises. One of the results has been increased problems for private firms trying to stay on their feet, with the inevitable consequence that demands increase for state operation and all kinds of subsidies, leading to more controls and intensification of state power. This is only one of many examples of how the socialist majority affects our form of society.

The major organ of the Center Party, NATIONEN, recently showed how the tax system hits private employers:

"If a wage earner who makes 70,000 kroner is to increase his purchasing power by 2000 kroner and the price rise is 10 percent the firm must pay out 24,000 kroner in additional wages. If we go up to the 150,000-kroner wage level the firm will have to spend another 60,000 kroner (to provide 2000 kroner in increased purchasing power). The examples are a frightening illustration of how costly tax progression is for businesses...the jobs become insecure."

The loss of confidence that could be noted over a longer period of time in relations between the Labor Party and its traditional voters has been strengthened, partly as a result of the party's inability to master the problems confronting us. Internal divisions, the leadership crisis, inability to make decisions in a difficult period filled with problems--in reality these are three sides of the same thing. And these things were behind the veritable blow-out former LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions] chairman Tor Aspengren presented in a letter to the central committee of the Labor Party about a year ago. Aspengren's criticism of the lack of leadership, a criticism that undoubtedly has broad support from many rural and urban Social Democrats, was directed against both policy and the people placed in the highest posts by the party. Although the conflict was resolved--apparently--at a well-orchestrated meeting at the highest level, nothing was really done about the urgent central problems Aspengren wanted to clear up. After the laundering process behind closed doors the problems still remained--more pressing than they were before.

And as the erosion of being in a minority government increases from month to month in step with a development that is full of crises, it will seem increasingly urgent to many people that the national party congress in the spring lays a foundation for a new "image," a face-lifting that can make the party more attractive to the voters. But how to do that without removing certain people--that remains a thorny problem. The problem will be further accentuated by the realization that the Labor Party apparently has nothing new to offer aside from more or less clever variations of well-known socialist objectives. Whether a political product can become more salable because of the person selling it, be that person a man or a woman, can certainly be a matter of discussion. But in the almost desperate situation in which the Labor Party now finds itself many people will undoubtedly feel that new leadership is a decisive prerequisite for bringing the party on the offensive.

Prime Minister Odvar Nordli is suffering the same fate as the political leaders in many countries where problems are piling up and nothing works. And it is no different in Norway than in other open democratic societies--the prime minister

is held personally responsible for everything that goes wrong. Rightly or wrongly. People need somebody to blame.

Even so, the head of a government must of course take responsibility for his actions. No matter how wicked the world is one cannot flee from reality. The opposition can claim with complete justice that a number of the problems we are struggling with in this country are due to government policy, a policy so reckless that it has overlooked important realities in our own situation. And a good many of the prime minister's problems are his own fault. The impression he gives of being perplexed by difficult issues, of being unable to make decisions--in time--have created uncertainty and doubt as to whether the government is mature enough for the job. When this is also true in matters of broad national importance it is a sure way to undermine one's own position.

More than anything else the government has its own administrative problems to contend with and the lack of administrative ability that has come to light in a number of areas underlines the need for a power shift in Norwegian politics. As Jens A. Christophersen, associate professor of political science, pointed out in an interview with NATIONEN earlier this month the voters make one fundamental demand of a government regardless of its political composition, and that demand is that it rule. The average citizen does not just react to the policy pursued by a government. He also reacts when it doesn't pursue any policy at all.

That has been the problem of the Nordli government. And this could be the big challenge of a nonsocialist government after 1981 according to Jens A. Christophersen who reminds us that what is happening to the Labor Party now is not the first example we have had of voters turning away from their parties for failing to demonstrate a capacity to rule.

When the Borten government broke up in 1971, brought down by its own people, the Labor Party managed to get backing of more than 50 percent for the first and so far last time. Thus there were at least that many people who thought at the time that only the Labor Party could run the country.

Former Conservative chairman Erling Norvik is undoubtedly right when he points out that some of the Labor Party decline is due to the fact that the party never managed to take the right stand at the right time at any point in the 1970's. If the Labor Party and the government had accepted some of the advice and proposals offered by other parties the political picture would probably have been quite different.

If the latest opinion polls were identical with the election results in September 1981 the outcome would have been a slide of seats from the Labor Party to the Conservatives. But Gallup polls are not elections and as always one should be very careful not to exaggerate the importance of opinion polls. This basic rule should be assigned special emphasis in a period when political conditions are changing more rapidly than ever.

Even so it can be established that the long-range tendency of the opinion polls gives the nonsocialist parties as a whole a better point of departure than they

have had prior to any election in recent years. This is mainly due to the strong gains made by the Conservatives, voter support levels of 28-30 percent in the opinion polls in recent months. With a deliberate joint effort the nonsocialist parties would have a real chance to bring about the power shift wanted by the majority of the Norwegian people.

The discussion of the government alternatives prior to the next election actually leaves no doubt that a nonsocialist majority in Storting will result in the formation of a broad nonsocialist coalition government. And by "broad" we mean in this context a government consisting of the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, the same parties who agreed in a joint declaration in April 1976 to form a government together if the last Storting election had produced a nonsocialist majority. As you know not many votes kept the election victory from going in favor of the nonsocialist parties in that election.

Differences of opinion on central political issues could complicate government negotiations aimed at clarifying the political basis for a future nonsocialist government. The final decision will be based on whether the individual parties on the basis of a total evaluation feel they would have more influence from being part of the government than from being part of the opposition. A general realization that government cooperation would provide more benefits than disadvantages for participating parties is the most vital political reality in the question of nonsocialist cooperation. Therefore there is no great doubt as to what the answer will be for the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party. The Liberals are out of it in this context, since the party has declared it would not participate in any government that contained the Conservatives.

There is one factor that one should keep in mind. If the Liberals should come in a pivotal position after the election--which all good powers forbid!--the party would feel its political interests best served by bringing down a nonsocialist government. The Liberal Party's general secretary since 1970, Asbjorn Liland, made it clear to POLKETS FRAMTID that his party's evaluation of the situation is that the Labor Party, after a pause for reflection, would pursue a policy more in line with Liberal desires than an H-K-S [Conservative-Christian People's-Center] coalition would be willing to. The Liberal Party intends to take the consequences of that.

Against this background many nonsocialist voters do not understand the open courting of the Liberals by the Christian People's Party and the Center Party. Center Party chairman Johan J. Jakobsen and Christian People's Party vice chairman Kjell Magne Bondevik have both stressed that they consider concrete practical cooperation with the Liberal Party as a much stronger political demarcation than verbal assurances or less binding moves on the part of the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party jointly. Jakobsen and Bondevik make no secret of the point that the major job is to outline the center parties as a clear, independent alternative to the Conservatives and this is their contribution to a broad and credible nonsocialist cooperation. That this double dealing--as many regard it--by the middle parties may simply lead to increased support for the Conservatives is something they seem unaware of so far, strangely enough.

During the fall session many have speculated over the relations of the Conservative Party with the center parties. There is little reason for that. Conservative leaders have repeatedly stressed that their main desire is to have a non-socialist government based on a majority in Storting. Such a majority can be obtained only if the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party join forces in a government coalition. But, as Conservative chairman Jo Benkow says, if one or two parties do not wish to participate in such a government for political or other reasons, the voters should know that the Conservatives are ready to assume that responsibility anyway.

Nonsocialist voters will undoubtedly value this statement.

All who work actively for a power shift in the next election and think this is a superordinate objective for the nonsocialist parties agree that it is now or never. If there are still parties in which partisan egotism and solo status take the upper hand nonsocialist voters should take the consequences of that and support the party or parties that guarantee a nonsocialist coalition alternative.

The political situation underlines the fundamental importance of presenting an effective nonsocialist alternative before the 1981 election. If the development toward a socialist society is not stopped now, it could be too late.

6578

CSO: 3108

NEW ANTINUCLEAR WEAPONS MOVEMENT WOULD EXCLUDE USSR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Only the North Without Atoms"]

[Text] Nuclear weapons in the East and in the West must be done away with. No nuclear weapons in Norway, neither in war nor in peace. With this program "No to Nuclear Weapons" is starting an offensive to become a popular movement in Norway. At a meeting in Oslo yesterday, when the movement presented itself to the public, it was asserted that "A zone in the North free of nuclear weapons would be an important contribution to the work for disarmament. The plan for such a zone includes Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, but not the Kola [Peninsula] and the Baltic area.

"But why not concentrate the effort to do away with nuclear weapons upon where they are found in the North -- on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic area?" In response to this question Professor Erik Alfsen, member of the movement's board of directors, replied: "We must begin the work for a zone free of nuclear weapons in a clearly delimited area. It is realistic to begin with the four Nordic countries that do not have nuclear weapons. It must be clear that we cannot draw into the plan for a Nordic zone the strategic retaliation weapons found on the Kila Peninsula. Those weapons are aimed at other targets than Norway."

The movement's spokesmen stressed that a zone in the North free of atomic weapons must be seen as a link in the work for a more comprehensive agreement on a Europe free of nuclear arms. In these efforts No to Nuclear Weapons will work in close contact with the campaign for nuclear disarmament in Europe (END.) "Nuclear weapons must not be stored, produced or used in the zone. Further, it is important to establish rules to prevent overflight in the air space of the zone by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. A zone arrangement must be based on bilateral guarantees by the superpowers not to use nuclear weapons on land in the zone," say members of the movement, who characterize use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humanity. They demand that stores of such weapons be removed through binding agreements. It is pointed out in particular that disarmament negotiations in Europe must lead to an agreement to the effect that the 572 NATO missiles must neither be produced nor put into position. The same applies to the Soviet Union's SS-20 missiles. "The goal of the negotiations must be that of eliminating these weapons, not only that of setting an upper limit to them after they have been introduced."

The board of directors of No to Atomic Weapons, an organization that wishes to work across political party lines, independently of political parties, is composed of the following members: Professor Erik Alfseu; Odd Bach, vice chairman of the Norwegian Federation of Transport Workers; Cand. Theol. Trond Bakkevig; Thorbjorn Jagland, chairman of the Labor Party Youth Organization; Architect Gynt Krag, deputy leader of the Liberal Party Berit Kvaeven; Teacher Herman Lovenskiold; Housewife Ingerid Magnus; Rector Tove Pihl; Lars Martin Skipevag, deputy leader of the youth organization of the Christian People's Party; Editor Rolf Thue; and Jon Grepstad, the Movement's secretary.

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CSO: 3108

SOLDIER ARRESTED FOR TRYING TO SELL SECRETS TO USSR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 Dec 80 p 5

[Article: "Soldier, 20, Tries To Sell Secrets"]

[Text] The 20-year-old soldier arrested and indicted for having offered to the Soviet Embassy in Oslo military documents obtained at his place of service has confessed during interrogation by the surveillance police. He was arrested Thursday 27 November, and was committed to jail by the court of interrogatory the next day. In the opinion of the surveillance police he did not offer his services to the Russians in the hope of gain. For the time being, nothing is known of the soldier's real motive for his act. This was his first time in trouble with the police. His political interests are unknown, and the police believe he acted as he did mostly for the sake of the thrill. After the NTB [Norwegian Telegram Bureau] had reported that it was the Russians who warned the Norwegian authorities of the Norwegian soldier's approach to the embassy, AFTENPOSTEN asked Surveillance Police Chief Gunnar Haarstad whether this was true.

"I deny categorically the report to the effect that Norwegian authorities received information from the Russians about the soldier's action. This is in no way true. I can state, however, that we do not think the Russians showed any great interest in the soldier's offer to sell secret documents."

In response to a question about whether the soldier's action was of a serious nature, the Chief of the Surveillance police replied: "I believe we can say that the matter does not seem very serious. I should add, however, that many of the serious cases of espionage we unveiled through the years began rather in a modest way, later developing into serious cases."

According to the Surveillance Police Chief the soldier has confessed to the crimes of which he is accused. The indictment concerns crimes mentioned in Chapter 8 of the criminal code which cover crimes against the independence and security of the state.

The soldier was a driver and messenger at a military office in Oslo. He has admitted turning over a classified document to the Soviet embassy. In the search of his home the police found a military document marked "Confidential." The soldier has admitted that he removed this document from the office where he worked. Those responsible in the military have a copy of the classified document the soldier gave to the embassy, and it is now being studied by military experts for the purpose of assessing in detail the information obtained by a foreign power through the document. This study will be completed in the near future, at which time the surveillance police will consider the investigation of the case completed.

11256

CSO: 3108

BRIEFS

ANTISTOCKPILING PETITION TO NORDLI--"I shall call attention of the government to the protest lists I have received," Prime Minister Odvar Nordli promised when representatives of the Action Against Stockpiling yesterday handed over more than 100,000 signatures from opponents of stockpiling of military equipment in Norway. "We know that opinion is divided in the people on this matter. I take this protest as an expression of the strong will in the Norwegian people to oppose an increased arms race in the world," said the Prime Minister. "We find ourselves in a tremendously tense international situation. In such situations we must to the extent possible stand together in the defense of our country. I hope that we can agree on that, at least, and that it is urgently necessary to intensify efforts for relaxation of tensions and real disarmament. I want you to know that the government will do all in its power to make such efforts successful," said the Prime Minister. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 Dec 80 p 3] 11256

CSO: 3108

DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH EAST TIMOR

FRETILIN Leader Lobato Interview

Lisbon EXPRESSO REVISTA in Portuguese 5 Dec 80 pp 13R-15R

[Interview with Rogerio Lobato, FRETILIN Central Committee member, commander of East Timor National Liberation Forces and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, by Carlos Gil; date and place not given]

[Text] Next Sunday will mark the fifth anniversary of the invasion of the Portuguese colony of East Timor by Indonesian troops. Despite the thousands of deaths, deportations and banishments, that middle island has not even yet been "pacified." With greater or lesser intensity, the people of East Timor are still fighting against the passivity of public opinion and international governments and ill-concealed neglect by the successive governments in Lisbon. Last month, Rogerio Lobato, a member of the Central Committee of the FRETILIN [Front for an Independent East Timor], commander of the East Timor National Liberation Armed Forces, and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, agreed to an interview with Carlos Gil (who thus became one of the few Portuguese journalists to interview that East Timor leader). During the interview, Rogerio Lobato told how and why this struggle is being waged in East Timor, along with many criticisms of the conduct of various successive Portuguese political leaders who, in one way or another, were involved in the "exemplary decolonization" of East Timor.

Along with this, we are publishing a short report by our London correspondent, Maria Teresa Guerreiro, on revelations made in Australia, and reported in Great Britain by the weekly NEW STATESMAN, according to which the British and American governments connived in the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

Carlos Gil: On 15 August 1975, the Central Committee of the FRETILIN appealed for armed resistance throughout the territory of East Timor. Civil war developed in the most distant Portuguese colony. The Portuguese army disintegrated, while its native soldiers deserted, taking their weapons with them, to join the parties in conflict, mainly the FRETILIN. The pro-FRETILIN troops commanded by

Rogério Lobato succeeded in reversing the situation to their own benefit, and a month later they controlled the greater part of the territory. Who was this young guerrilla leader, only 25 years of age?

Rogério Lobato: Long before 25 April 1974, I attended the Dare Seminary. In 1971, already having left the seminary, I was drafted into the Portuguese colonial army, like all the young men of my age at that time. My political affiliations began after 25 April, and were the product of the fact that I served in the Portuguese colonial army as a militia supply corporal, in which capacity I began to pursue political tasks of mobilization with the soldiers. Later, the Central Committee of the FRETILIN entrusted me with the first and only course which was finally offered for militia officers. The UDT coup on 10 August 1975 found me at the general headquarters of the Portuguese colonial army. As of that date, I was chosen by the entire East Timor military who had joined the FRETILIN to command our forces. The Portuguese army was made up for the most part of native troops. Despite the apolitical propaganda pursued by the Portuguese colonialists in East Timor, the truth is that the soldiers were above all nationalists and could not be diverted from the problems which affected our country, and the future of East Timor, at that time.

Carlos Gil: You said that the people of East Timor are essentially nationalist. But in October of 1974, when he returned from a visit to East Timor, the then-minister for interterritorial coordination, Almeida Santos, told the mass media about the patriotism and love of Portugal and the Portuguese flag he had seen among its citizens.

Rogério Lobato: There were people in East Timor who defended links with Portugal and created conditions for persuading some that the people loved Portugal and wanted to continue to be Portuguese. The Portuguese colonials always promoted this propaganda about the love of the flag.

Carlos Gil: Curiously, there is no word for flag in the Tetum dialect of East Timor!

Rogério Lobato: Well, this does not mean that the people of East Timor have no understanding of the meaning of the word flag. We have the FRETILIN flag, which the people truly love. But it is an insult to say that our people always loved the Portuguese flag. For us it is a strange and unfortunate attitude which a man who claimed to be progressive, Almeida Santos, adopted after 25 April, saying that the people of East Timor loved Portugal, solely because he saw some persons at demonstrations organized by the former UDT waving Portuguese flags. At that point, we had occasion to see evidence of the contrary. Almeida Santos went to see East Timor with the eyes of a colonial and not the eyes of a decolonizer. He saw what the former UDT did, but he did not report what the FRETILIN revealed in East Timor. He went to East Timor with the intention to promote the former UDT and to exclude the FRETILIN.

Carlos Gil: What did the FRETILIN make clear to Almeida Santos?

Rogério Lobato: At that point, the FRETILIN was already the party with the most support, the greatest acceptance among the people of East Timor. The FRETILIN

had shown this in large demonstrations held for Almeida Santos. When he came, we protested against the statements he had made.

Carlos Gil: I would like to note that 28 November is precisely the fifth anniversary of the unilateral proclamation of the independence of East Timor. This fact may have been the detonator of the imminent invasion of the Indonesians, on 7 December 1975. On that day, Radio East Timor made the following statement: "The Indonesians have invaded. Their soldiers are in Dili. They will kill without discrimination. Women and children will be fired on in the streets." Then it ceased broadcasting. Later that day, the Portuguese government informed the president of the Security Council that Indonesia had invaded East Timor with naval, air and land forces, and it termed this intervention an "act of aggression." On that same day, Portugal broke off all diplomatic relations with Indonesia. I want to refer again to Minister Almeida Santos. Some months before the Indonesian invasion, he answered a question from the newspaper O SECULO on "the risk of a possible military intervention by Indonesia in East Timor" with the following statement: "It is important in connection with the unlikely nature of such intervention is the consistent and clear official position of the authorities in Djakarta, reaffirmed a number of times, including to me personally when I went there, to the effect that Indonesia does not nurture any territorial ambitions with regard to Portuguese Timor." And he went on to say: "Military intervention by Indonesia would be a serious error, and so universally and promptly criticized that I cannot imagine this step being risked for uncertain future gains. Sensible politicians do not put the cart before the horse." I would ask you now what, 5 years after the Indonesian invasion, the political and military situation in East Timor is?

Rogério Lobato: The invasion of East Timor by Indonesia was a military venture with unforeseeable risks. The plans of the Indonesian generals for controlling East Timor in 3 days, as they had initially planned, failed. On the contrary, the FRETILIN has been able to resist until now, inflicting more than 30,000 casualties on the invading army. The people of East Timor will have had to pay a very high price for their liberation, for they suffered some 30,000 casualties. Given the geopolitical situation of our country, the political-military situation is difficult, but we cannot regard it as lost. We find ourselves in the phase of struggle regarded as strategic defense, in which we launch attacks and armed actions which are small in scale and of a tactical nature. The strategic objective is to sustain the forces of the FRETILIN, to resist as long as possible, so that the prolonged nature of the armed struggle will make the contradictions among the various Indonesian generals' factions more acute. One of our goals is also to create the conditions so that the guerrilla army can give rise to a regular army, and to pursue the efforts necessary so that within a few years we can reach a balance with the invading forces.

Carlos Gil: Isn't it utopian to believe that a balance of forces can be achieved?

Rogério Lobato: We are speaking in relative terms. We will not achieve absolute parity. This would be very difficult, because we do not have the logistic support means the invading army has, with the full support of imperialism.

Carlos Gil: The manuals written by guerrilla technicians make a statement which is well known, and not only among the military: If there is not concrete support from the population, guerrilla fighters will find it difficult to triumph over the occupying or invading army. It is a question of being in one's own element.

Rogério Lobato: We too adhere to the principle that the guerrilla fighter must live in his surroundings like a fish in water. For us the water would be the people. The FRETILIN, even before the war against the Indonesian aggressors began, weighed this point and mobilized the people. I remember having said to the Australian television and radio journalists in December of 1975 that apart from the regular troops joining the FRETILIN as of 20 August 1975, we had already trained several thousand militiamen throughout the country. Our concern at that point was to provide them with a minimum of knowledge about weapons and firing, to teach them to put the bullet in the chamber, to aim and to kill the Indonesians.

Carlos Gil: Is the FRETILIN experiencing great difficulties?

Rogério Lobato: We are having difficulties, certainly. I would not say that they are completely overcome. We began the struggle with thousands of weapons captured from the Portuguese colonial army. We had thousands of armed men at the time of the invasion.

Carlos Gil: Were there heavy weapons?

Rogério Lobato: There were some, but those we had were very ancient. Some 75-millimeter guns the Portuguese brought to East Timor, but they had dumped the ammunition in the sea long before 25 April, worried about what might happen one day. Even before that date they wanted to send us back to Portugal, but some military units protested, because we knew the Indonesians were on the other side of the border. Governor Lemos Pires, when he fled from East Timor, allowed 600 G-3 machine guns to remain behind, but he gave orders that the breeches should be hidden. I remember that on the day we proclaimed independence, 28 November 1975, the battalion which marched in the official ceremonies did so with guns lacking breeches.

Carlos Gil: We know that the struggle in East Timor is difficult because there is no rear guard.

Rogério Lobato: There is in fact the problem of supplying our forces, but we believe that the best system of transporting munitions and weapons to the FRETILIN is the Indonesian army. The United States, France, the FRG and England manufacture weapons, Indonesia brings them to East Timor, and the FRETILIN captures them. To turn to the new aspect of the struggle in East Timor, if we were to analyze the war theories of great thinkers, we will see that completely new experiences are occurring in East Timor. Look at the military writings of Mao Zedong. Some things do not apply to East Timor, where the conditions are different from those in China. For example, in the war between Japan and China, one of the tactics used was retreat. China is a vast territory, and it is possible to retreat as far as Tibet, and there is a great potential for maneuvering against the invader or occupant, for deploying forces and attacking the enemy from the rear or the flank.

Carlos Gil: Retreat in East Timor means backing into the sea.

Rogério Lobato: Well, if the enemy attacks us in the mountains in East Timor, we often go to the beaches, or vice versa. The secret of war in East Timor lies in this mobility within very limited territorial space. It is for this reason that we are recording new experiences. An analysis of the experience of Cuba, also an island, also shows differences. Cuba achieved a rather substantial level of industrialization and the production forces were very different from those in East Timor when the armed struggle began. We did not even have anyone who could fly a plane. In Cuba, there were Cuban pilots to do this. We had no sailors. In 500 years of colonialism, the Portuguese did not train one of us as a sailor, a pilot or a physician. This is the specific situation which must be analyzed in order to understand the struggle in East Timor. Faced with these difficulties, the resistance for 5 years of the Mauber people, led by the FRETILIN, represents a victory. Timor is an island without a rear guard, and we are surrounded by countries with reactionary governments. It is under these difficulties that we developed our creativity. If we are asked where the weapons come from, we will say that the majority come from the Indonesians. Some are won in combat, others are traded for our coffee, with the corrupting of Indonesian soldiers and officers. This is no secret to anyone.

Carlos Gil: Has Indonesia increased its occupation forces recently?

Rogério Lobato: Currently there are thousands of Indonesian soldiers in East Timor. We have reports that they want to reinforce their ranks in December with another 20 to 30,000 soldiers in order to put an end, they hope, to the FRETILIN guerrilla fighters. Clearly the new offensive represents a threat, but if in 5 years they have not succeeded in defeating the FRETILIN, they are not going to do so now.

Carlos Gil: There has been yet another debate in the United Nations on the East Timor question. What is the position of the Central Committee of the FRETILIN in the diplomatic struggle it has undertaken?

Rogério Lobato: We must develop parallel struggles on the military and diplomatic levels. When there are great military victories, there are great diplomatic victories as well. At this moment we are seeing a number of imperialist maneuvers on the diplomatic level, and the most dangerous is the desire to hold a referendum in East Timor. Unfortunately this imperialist position is defended by the Sa Carneiro government. Our position on this matter is rejection of a referendum in East Timor. The Central Committee of the FRETILIN, when it proclaimed independence on 28 November 1975, interpreted the desires of the Mauber people and at this time we are fighting as an independent but occupied country, which has been attacked and which has had its sovereignty and territorial integrity threatened by a foreign power. When the Portuguese government speaks of a referendum, it ignores the situation in East Timor, the tremendous sacrifices and privations our people have agreed to and tolerated throughout these 5 years of heroic resistance and national liberation struggle. The most proper and just position, which the Portuguese government should have adopted, was to: I. Recognize the FRETILIN as the legitimate representative of the people of East Timor; II. Recognize the Democratic Republic of East Timor; III. Demand the withdrawal

of all the Indonesian forces of aggression from East Timor and condemn the Indonesian invasion in harsh terms; and IV. Contribute on the diplomatic level to the international recognition of the FRETILIN and the RDTL [Democratic Republic of East Timor]. If the Portuguese government were to adopt this position, it would create conditions for the establishment of an atmosphere of good relations with the RDTL in the future.

Carlos Gil: But the Portuguese government does not regard the FRETILIN as the sole representative of the people of East Timor, and in its recent plans for East Timor it calls for "hearing all the movements representative of the people of East Timor."

Rogério Lobato: Obviously it is unaware and has even created some puppet movements, seeking to place on a level of equality with the FRETILIN movements which represent nothing but themselves. Basically, the so-called UDT is now defunct, as is the APODETI. What they called the UDT in Portugal is not that, because the UDT which developed in East Timor made a public statement of its support of Indonesia in 1975 and its president is currently the puppet vice governor of the Indonesians in Dili. There are some individuals who do not want to accept the facts. They yearn for the past, are proud and arrogant. The head of the so-called UDT in Portugal is Moises Amaral, an individual who during the colonial period was an agent of the former PIDE/DGS [Police for the Control of Foreigners and Defense of the State/Directorate General for Security] in what was formerly Porto Amelia, in Mozambique. If we analyze the other movement, the National Movement for the Liberation of Timor (MONALIT), the people involved are not serious either. One of its two most outstanding leaders, Jacob Xavier, has a police record for illegal trafficking in diamonds in Angola, where he was in prison for 2 years. The so-called UDT in Portugal is an extension of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]. The MONALIT is a creation of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], or at least of one of its leaders. Are these the factions which want to direct our people? It is impossible, and an insult to our people. In addition to all of this, they are not even nationalists. The so-called UDT in Portugal believes that the Indonesian occupation is a fact. Not even Portugal recognizes it. The MONALIT says that it is a Portuguese movement. After all, how can they defend the interests of the people of Timor?

Carlos Gil: What is the position with regard to the speech to the United Nations by Freitas do Amaral?

Rogério Lobato: We believe that it is important for Portugal to assume its historic and moral responsibilities, but intentions are not enough. When Portugal says it is assuming its responsibilities and establishes contact with Indonesia without consulting the FRETILIN, it is engaging in demagoguery. We are watchful and vigilant of the maneuvers of the Portuguese government. Moreover, we do not believe in the good intentions or the good faith of the Portuguese government, because in practice it reveals the opposite. It contacts the Indonesians without consulting the FRETILIN, it says it wants to negotiate with Indonesia, with or without the FRETILIN, it wants to place the FRETILIN on a plane of equality with other movements which are not even in the struggle but are living comfortably at the expense of the refugee commission in Portugal.

The mysterious mission entrusted to Moraes e Silva in East Timor by the reactionary government of Sa Carneiro bears witness once again to the demagogy, the hypocrisy and the lack of seriousness on the part of the AD [Democratic Alliance] government. The FRETILIN will respond to the maneuvers of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism by intensifying the armed struggle in East Timor and in Indonesia. If necessary, we will fight another 20 years, in the certainty that the solution to the East Timor problem will always be imposed by the force of the armed struggle headed by the Central Committee of the FRETILIN.

Carlos Gil: The Portuguese plan for East Timor further calls for a series of measures of humanitarian support, calling for the repatriation and return of the citizens of Timor.

Rogério Lobato: We do not need acts of charity from Portugal. The problem is above all political. As to the humanitarian question, the steps Portugal wants to take in this sector will basically only serve to favor the Indonesian plan. Portugal says it wants to reunite families from Timor. This is an old Indonesian plan which is designed to get all of its citizens out of East Timor in order then to repopulate it with people from other Indonesian islands. There is an Indonesian plan for the forced migration of 300,000 people from the islands of Bali and Java to East Timor. The purpose of this plan is the forced repopulation of our country, and it is designed to alter the demographic situation in favor of Indonesia. This plan is sinister and macabre because it seeks to annihilate the cultural and national identity of our people and remove the base of support for the armed resistance and national liberation struggle.

Carlos Gil: Has this already been done by the Indonesians on other islands?

Rogério Lobato: It is true that it has. The Indonesians plan to take hundreds of thousands of Javanese to Papua New Guinea, and also to the Moluccas, Borneo, Celebes, Sumatra and Flores. Portugal plans to aid Indonesia in recolonizing East Timor. These are the good intentions of the Portuguese government. We do not ask Portugal to send weapons or troops to East Timor. It would be unrealistic for us to think in these terms. We only want political support from Portugal. I reiterate that the Central Committee of the FRETILIN does not believe in the good intentions or the good faith of the Portuguese government. If there are people who do, this is an isolated and opportunistic position adopted against the interests of our people.

Carlos Gil: How do you view the role of other earlier governments?

Rogério Lobato: It was a role of total complicity with the American imperialists. We know that the government of the United States exerted pressure on the Portuguese government at that time to prevent it from moving forward in any way in regard to East Timor. General Costa Gomes was president of the republic. The FRETILIN, on the contrary, has always had very serious intentions of negotiating with Portugal, but unfortunately nothing was ventured by Costa Gomes. Ironically, General Costa Gomes is today a member of the World Council of Peace, while at that time he did not want to contribute to peace in East Timor. What is the peace which he defends, after all? I would like to note further that there have been large demonstrations of solidarity with the struggles of other peoples in

Portugal throughout these 5 years. Last year there was a campaign of solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people. We support the struggle of the Palestinian people, but we find it very strange that, since our people were directly colonized by the Portuguese, there has never been the slightest attention paid by the Portuguese antifascists or internationalists.

Carlos Gil: The president of the republic, General Ramalho Eanes, met with the highest leader of the Palestinian people, Yasser Arafat, last year, during this solidarity campaign. The PLO was given the reception of a chief of state in Portugal. Has Ramalho Eanes ever welcomed a member of the FRETILIN or a minister of the Democratic Republic of East Timor?

Rogério Lobato: To date, the president of the republic has never welcomed any of us, and this is because he himself deemed it untimely. We would like to know when it will be timely. After East Timor is liberated? At this juncture, the president would even like to establish a Portuguese embassy in the RDTL. It is interesting that the president was so sensitive to the Palestinian problem, that of a people who have nothing to do with Portugal historically. I think this was an attitude which developed out of the interest in relations with Arab countries because of the oil market. But we should have been welcomed first. It would appear that the cart has been put before the horse.

Carlos Gil: What are the prospects in the struggle the FRETILIN is waging against the Indonesian invaders?

Rogério Lobato: It is in the 1980s that we will free East Timor from the Indonesian yoke. It is not only the FRETILIN which is fighting against the Indonesian generals at this time. Within Indonesia itself we are witnessing armed uprisings in Sumatra and in Papua New Guinea, where the National Liberation Front of Aceh-Sumatra and the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) also exist. In July of this year, when the FRETILIN attacked Dili, the OPM forces simultaneously attacked Jayapura, the capital of Papua New Guinea, where an Indonesian colonel and seven lower-ranking officers were captured. In that same month, the OPM forces annihilated 2 Indonesian platoons near the Mamberamo River, taking 60 prisoners. The FRETILIN is now coordinating its war efforts with those of these movements. Our struggle has ceased to be only a struggle within East Timor, and has become one within Indonesia itself as well. Ours is a common struggle, because we have a common enemy--the bloody and fascist Suharto regime.

Carlos Gil: Will this common struggle have a common direction?

Rogério Lobato: Today a process which is unknown to many people exists on the various Indonesian islands. We have been contacted by the armed opposition in Indonesia so that we can coordinate our war efforts against Suharto. We drafted an agreement for the creation of a joint general staff for the anti-Suharto forces, and such a general staff has already recently been established in South-east Asia.

Carlos Gil: The situation in Indonesia does not seem to be very favorable to Suharto, since there are contradictions among the generals.

Rogério Lobato: Yes. The situation is good for the struggle against Suharto. General Ali Moertopo does not exclude the possibility of civil war in Indonesia if Suharto is not elected in 1982. The contradictions among the Indonesian generals benefit our struggle, which will cover all of Indonesia. If Indonesia wants to integrate us by force, we have no alternative but to disintegrate it, also by force. Suharto will not succeed in controlling his archipelago of 13,700 islands with his old vessels and scrap iron from World War II. The FRETILIN and all the movements waging the struggle in Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas, Flores, Java and Papua New Guinea will determine what the fate of this bloody fascist called Suharto, the shah of Southeast Asia, will be. The future is bright and belongs by right to the people of the Democratic Republic of East Timor and the East Indies. Time will tell who was right.

Morais da Silva Visits

Lisbon EXPRESSO REVISTA in Portuguese 15 Nov 80 pp 1R-2R

[Article by Augusto de Carvalho: "Timor Community, Apprehensive, Wonders About the 'Mysterious' Visit"]

[Text] "Colonel Moraes da Silva, please excuse the inconvenience. We here at EXPRESSO have sought you out to obtain exact information about your trip to Timor. Can you tell us something?"

This was the nature of the short telephone conversation we had with Air Force Colonel Moraes da Silva at 1500 hours on Wednesday, before the UN vote on the East Timor issue was known.

[Answer] I can tell you nothing.

[Question] Why not?

[Answer] A very serious matter is involved.

[Question] But couldn't you meet me for an informal talk so we could exchange some impressions?

[Answer] Impossible.

[Question] Can you give me at least the exact date of your trip?

[Answer] As to that, you must consult the TAP [Portuguese Airlines] lists.

[Question] The fact is we will have a report this week and we have some information on your trip which we would like if possible to confirm.

[Answer] I have already said that a very serious matter, with grave implications, is involved, and therefore I cannot discuss it at all.

Enlightening Mystery

After this talk, which moreover was cordial, we felt certain that the terms "mysterious" and "secret," used about this trip, were fully applicable.

Mysterious because almost no one knew about it, mysterious because every means was used to envelop it with secrecy and mystery. To judge from the letters from many citizens of Timor who, breaking through the close network of Indonesian vigilance, succeeded in reaching Portugal as free men, "apparently a Portuguese named Morais da Silva made a trip there." But all this mystery in the end provided some clues for its clarification: everything suggested that it came within the framework of Portuguese diplomatic contacts with Indonesia, in the hands of a Portuguese citizen with prestige in that zone. And not only that. One who enjoys the profound sympathies of the local authorities and who supports Timor, to the exact extent that East Timor incorporated in his personality Portuguese components which gave him his own characteristic aspect, and who even points to his Timor origin. At least this is what Morais da Silva told EXPRESSO, precisely on 30 July 1976, when he was a general and chief of the air force general staff. This was during an informal talk after the trip which took him to the Orient to effect the liberation of 23 Portuguese citizens held as hostages by Indonesia.

What we wrote at that time as a result of this conversation may cast some light on the nature of the trip and the internal aspects of Portuguese diplomacy in the case under study, enabling us to detect its directions in this complicated international political meandering in which there are conflicting hegemonies with a new element now provided by the election of Ronald Reagan.

We wrote then: "We also obtained from Morais da Silva and other Portuguese political circles the impression that the integration of Timor in Indonesia is an irreversible fact and that Portugal can do nothing, in terms of efficiency, to prevent it." And again: "In any case, the path of Timor seems irreversible, and Portugal will have to save what can be saved in terms of political realism. What we succeeded in establishing is just this, which remains to be done. And this, basically, was the information gathered by Morais da Silva." Morais da Silva who completed his secondary studies in Timor, where he left many friends.

The air force general then worked to save what could be saved (for which read the survival of the Portuguese culture in that zone) and he regarded integration in Indonesia as inevitable, reasoning, according to what he said, from a realistic point of view, on the basis of a study of the forces in play. And he will have made his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along these lines, also based on elements gathered from Indonesian military sources, although not exclusively.

Support

If indeed there have been no substantial changes in the balance of forces sector, the cause of East Timor has succeeded in mobilizing considerable support since 1976 in the diplomatic sector, calling attention to the brutal and expansionist aggression.

It is this support which has culminated now in the United Nations vote approving the resolution asserting the right of East Timor to self-determination. There were 58 votes in favor, 35 against and 46 abstentions. The resolution said that "the people of East Timor must be able freely to determine their own future, under the auspices of the United Nations." Thus the Indonesian claim, to the effect that East Timor has been an integral part of its territory since 1976 "by the express will of the local population," was not recognized. The Indonesian delegate, Sumayo Suryokusumo, rejected the resolution. Indonesia will continue the struggle on the diplomatic and practical level.

The genocide which Indonesia has been perpetrating in East Timor since that time, attempting to reduce the voice of a people to silence by force, is beginning despite everything to become known in the international arena.

Meanwhile, although the positive action pursued by our diplomats at the United Nations should be stressed, the people of Timor fear that other actions are being planned so that the annexation by Indonesia will become little by little an accepted fact, being forgotten in the end or still worse being sanctioned by the international community.

The Purpose of the Trip

According to representatives from Timor with whom we talked, Colonel Morais da Silva's trip may come precisely within the context of this complex of operations, which will develop in the near future in favor of Indonesia.

Morais da Silva went to that region, according to our information, and according to his own statements in talks with friends, "at the invitation of a friend in Indonesia." Who this person is is not publicly known, but through information we were able to gather we are led to believe that he is closely linked with the government, above all that group of generals already known to Morais da Silva in 1976. Thus he was royally welcomed in Djakarta "like a prince" (he was accompanied by his wife) they told us.

His wife was even the guest in Indonesia in the home of an officer, now a general and at that time a colonel, who commanded the attack operations in East Timor in 1976, remaining on duty there until 1977. He is a general currently serving in the region including Flores and Timor.

It was in the company of this general precisely that Morais da Silva paid a visit to the invaded zone, leaving his wife at his home, since there were other individuals interested in going to Timor as well, and to this end she surrendered her seat to a member of the delegation.

In Dili, Morais da Silva was officially welcomed by the head of Indonesian intelligence, Colonel Sinaga, who is the strongman of the invading power, a man who according to eyewitnesses who talked with us and the testimony of refugees massacred the people in Timor and documented various executions in his account. He is, from all points of view, the military strongman of Indonesia in that occupied territory. He was also welcomed by Guilherme Maria Goncalves, the Indonesian governor, once a powerful member of the Apodetti, the party which

advocated integration even prior to the invasion. Sinaga and Guilherme Maria Goncalves accompanied Morais da Silva throughout the day and a half of guided tours he made in East Timor. Morais da Silva flew over a part of the territory to observe military operations in the field, which he could do with relative ease, given their technical simplicity. He also went to the Maliana zone, where Indonesia is trying to carry out a pilot project in the farm sector. In fact, Indonesia is concerned currently with developing the educational and agricultural sectors above all, as a means of winning popular sympathy.

According to our reports, Morais da Silva had yet another meeting with a group of Portuguese still living there, a meeting of a humanitarian nature, in this case.

On the basis of this information, it is legitimate to ask what kind of report Morais da Silva may have given the Portuguese government, in view of the sources on which at this point he can rely. It was this question which individuals in the Timor community wanted to make public through EXPRESSO, which now has a more detailed account of the trip made by this prestigious air force officer. Morais da Silva is reported to have said in talks with citizens of Timor that despite a collective sadness to be seen in the people, they are living rather better today than before 25 April, and that this fact is due to integration in Indonesia.

However, the general impressions of Morais da Silva are not at all consistent, we are told by the majority of individuals in the Timor community in Lisbon, with "the letters reaching us secretly, letters which come to us via even Indonesian military personnel themselves, and they are also inconsistent with the most recent reports of the refugees."

In fact, an average of 100 refugees a month are arriving, effecting their escape as they can, bribing the Indonesian authorities with sizeable sums. They begin by paying \$500, more or less, to the officers in East Timor, to obtain free passage to Djakarta, and there, with \$1,000 or more in addition, they manage to resolve their problems.

In this connection, some citizens of Timor told us that "we do not doubt the honesty of Morais da Silva, whose conduct at various times we have valued, to the point that we awarded him a decoration only given to great friends, but we have the right to ask what value there is in his views, with a certain tendency to defend integration as the only viable solution, given the forces in play, based only on the persons to whom he listened and who accompanied him."

However, as we said at the beginning, it was not possible for EXPRESSO to talk with Morais da Silva. Naturally, after what we have written in these pages, the illustrious air force officer felt obliged to respond. We told him on the telephone that he could do so even "after the fact." In any case there is an impression, with a certain justification, that Morais da Silva can through his Indonesian friends influence the future actions of the Portuguese executive branch. The United Nations vote, if indeed it was important, may be but a brief episode in the interplay of international expediencies operating in that area, in which Portugal has historic responsibilities.

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF: MILITARY NOT PLANNING GOVERNMENT OVERTHROW

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 6 Jan 81 p 13

[Excerpts] The statement made by Lt General Gabeiras, the Army chief of staff, that "the Army has no intention of making demands or dictatorships, but is irrevocably bent on carrying out its mission, established to perfection in the Constitution, which is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation," is the comment most appreciated by observers of all those made on the eve of the military New Year's celebration.

At 1-hour intervals yesterday, the defense minister officiated at three similar functions at each of the general headquarters of the Air Force, Navy and Army, where the respective chiefs of staff gave an account of the activities conducted during the previous year, and conveyed to him their major problems and concerns, as well as the intentions and goals for the year now beginning.

The Air Force chief of staff, Lt Gen Emiliano Alfaro Arregui, in his report, underscored the new organization of the Air Force which, by demarcating the lines of command, operation and backup, will make it possible to achieve functionalism in the system and optimal performance by the units.

Next, he reviewed the current status of the various programs: that of the future combat plane (FACA) on which a final decision must be made before next May; that of the Mirage F-1, wherein the delivery of aircraft has begun; that of the Casa-101, which will terminate during 1981; that of the VSAR (air surveillance and rescue), the strengthening of which with twin-engine planes and helicopters he deemed necessary with the purchase of new models; and that of MODAR (air weaponry modernization), wherein an attempt is being made to give the native industry maximum participation.

He also cited the POBAS (base strengthening) programs, to gear them to the new deployment and increase in air material; FATAM (future medium transport plane); and Grand Combat II, whereby an attempt is being made to modernize the air defense command, control and communications before 1983.

General Alfaro mentioned the operational type activities engaged in by the Air Force, with direct intervention in many exercises and maneuvers, and cited 120,000 hours of flight put in during 1980 (10,000 more than in the previous year), broken down into missions of all types.

The Air Force chief of staff concluded his remarks by stressing that aviation is very expensive and that the technological advances are overwhelming; emphasizing that seeking superiority and control of the air space entails a conscientious consideration of the price required to attain them.

At the Navy general headquarters, Adm Arevalo Pelluz stated that the rate of replacement of old vessels with other modern and more effective ones is not suitable and what we would all desire; hence it is reducing the effectiveness of the naval force.

The admiral reviewed the progress of the second phase of the naval program, citing: the delivery of the corvette "Infanta Cristina," which culminated the construction of the four corvettes in the first series; the progress made in the construction of submarines of the S-70 series; and that of the aircraft carrier hull, the three FFG frigates and the second series of corvettes, the first of which (the "Cazador") will be delivered in December 1981.

Indicating with gratification the degree of nationalization achieved in the construction of corvettes, which has reached 75 percent, and in that of the series S-70 submarines which, it is estimated, will reach 50 percent, Admiral Arevalo declared that committees comprised of personnel from the Navy and Spanish manufacturers have pursued contacts with foreign countries, from which promising results are anticipated.

The Navy chief of staff described the execution of the Supplementary Construction Plan associated with a series of completely national naval equipment units as well under way. They consist of oil tankers, tank barges, tugs and other auxiliary vessels of which another 13 units will be delivered this year.

As for the patrol vessels, he estimated that, during 1981, three 280-ton and four 85-ton units would be delivered to the Navy. The admiral also cited the delivery of the last four coast guard patrol boats, completing the series of 20, and the purchase from the United States of the new attack transport ships, "Castilla" and "Aragon," thereby improving the amphibious capacity.

In his account of activities in the operational area, Admiral Arevalo listed 31 collective training exercises of the naval force, and a total of combined exercises with the navies of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. He also mentioned 116 air defense exercises with the cooperation of the Air Force for the benefit of the naval force, and other cooperation given to the Army and Air Force, as well as the participation in 15 rescue and salvage operations at sea, in which 22 vessels participated.

Among the Navy's activities, he cited the effort expended in coastal and fishing surveillance, particularly that related to the Canary-Sahara shoal, in which 13 vessels participated, putting in a total of 1,380 days at sea. The submarine flotilla was underwater for a total of 8,360 hours, and the percentage of operativeness of the units comprising the aircraft flotilla was 74, with a total of 9,300 hours of flight.

Admiral Arevalo stated that the constant rise in fuel prices is cause for serious concern, claiming that it would be of little use to spend large amounts of money on the purchase of modern vessels if we later lacked the necessary fuel to enable them to engage in the operational activity that is essential for their effectiveness.

In contrast to the laconic quality of the remarks made by his counterparts in the Air Force and the Navy, the Army chief of staff, Lt General Gabeiras, added to the technical report a series of political comments which attracted the attention of observers.

General Gabeiras was the only one to mention terrorism, in paying tribute to the colleagues murdered by the enemies of Spain. He admitted that the commanders need constructive criticism in order to attain the goal of modernizing and updating the Army; and he claimed that the Army only wants to uphold and defend its reputation, and to inspire love for the nation, loyalty to the king, subordination to the government, affection for the people and respect that is a deterrent to its potential enemies.

The chief of staff declared that the Army has no partisan martyr, because its dead died for the nation to which we dedicate ourselves, not with petty politics, but rather a democratic specific weight of which, he said, "I wish to boast." Gabeiras remarked: "We shall not let anyone use our lofty attitude as a tool, and we shall give no one the option to identify us with his own interests, or to incite us to unfeasible leadership, always subordinate to our lofty missions, which we have converted into ideals."

According to Gabeiras, the solution to the organic, functional and economic problems is contingent upon the firm foundation of a military potential, without which there can be no possible national defense nor consistent foreign policy. The general's address also included an appeal for unity.

In the category of accomplishments, he mentioned the change in the deployment of units in the military regions; the creation of the special voluntary enlistment for tactical positions in operational units; the new helicopter bases in Valencia, Ciudad Real and Seville; the AMX-30 vehicle programs; the revision of the Joint Strategic Plan; and the 78 participations in connection with fires, accidents, floods and rescues, in which over 8,000 individuals, 900 land vehicles and 12 helicopters took part, with a toll of seven deaths and 28 injuries in these actions. He also cited the Army's participation in assistance missions to Nicaragua, Guinea and Algeria, during the difficult periods that they have experienced.

The defense minister, Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun, visited the three general headquarters to officiate at each of the functions, accompanied by Lt Gen Ignacio Alfaro Arregui, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the first link in the joint chain of military command of the Armed Forces.

The remarks were brief, and adhered to the same pattern. There were many references to the 1/80 General Report (see EL PAIS of 3 January), and one noted the effort not to bring up in advance the subjects of the speech that is to be delivered today at the reception which the king is tendering the three branches of the Armed Forces at the royal palace.

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COMMENTATOR SEES UCD ELECTION LOSS IF SUAREZ REMAINS LEADER

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 1 Dec 80 p 3

[Commentary by Pedro J. Ramirez]

[Excerpts] President Suarez' decision to call general elections as soon as our law of laws is approved was one of the most appropriate and courageous ones recalled of him. After the legal and political temporariness of the period in which the Constitution was prepared, there is nothing so logical and consistent as moving to a state of constitutional normality and democratic consolidation through the expedient of the polls.

However, these good intentions have been thwarted by events, so that the results as of next Saturday, the second anniversary of the constituent referendum, disclose setbacks rather than progress. It is difficult to have to admit, but Spanish democracy is weaker now than at the time of its founding.

These are the latest symptoms: a large number of attendees at the "nostalgia gathering" on Oriente Plaza; a disproportionate press treatment of incidents as theoretically superficial as the "Quintero report," or the intensive study of the caretaker government headed by Osorio; increased abstention in all the partial elections that have been held; the spread of terrorism to border provinces of the Basque Country, such as Santander, Zaragoza and Logrono; and an unstoppable increase in the number of unemployed, without entailing substantial improvements in the other macroeconomic factors.

Regardless of how much insistence there is on the part of a certain apocalyptic right, the situation is in no way comparable to that during the months preceding July 1936; because the only serious infection shown by the medical condition is that caused by the virus of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] terrorism. Fortunately, the two Spains do not exist, nor does the suicidal desire for internal confrontation appear anywhere, except in isolated extremist focal points.

What is indeed shown by the other aspects of the diagram is an alarming decline in defense. Even a mere pneumonia (and ETA is somewhat more than that) could put an end to an organism which has lost the desire to fight the disease, because it has lost faith in the value of its existence. This is why I shall never tire of repeating that the real coup d'etat that threatens us is the kind that intolerance, disillusionment and defeatism could cause in our hearts. Spain will be what we want it to be, and only hypocrites will find protection under the shadow of historical fatalism.

Although the regeneration of democracy depends, therefore, on the outcome of all those debates which take place daily in the conscience of each individual, it is obvious that the political superstructure could determine the conflict in one direction or another. The manner in which the nation is governed and the features of the alternative options at odds could be a stimulus, but also (and I think that this is the case, with each passing day) a heavy additional nuisance added to our old familiar devils.

The results of the elections in Seville and Almeria have only confirmed what was becoming more evident each day: Democracy will not be consolidated in this country until a new political arrangement is achieved among the conservative, moderate and progressive bourgeois sectors which, in June 1977 and March 1979, were bound together by UCD [Democratic Center Union]. An essential requisite, although not a sufficient one, for that new arrangement ever to occur (through the present parties, or others yet to be created) is, in my opinion (and apparently in that of the voters as well) a replacement in the leadership that has been exercised thus far by Adolfo Suarez.

UCD's two new defeats in Andalusia would be of little significance if it were not for serious qualitative and quantitative aggravating factors. Almeria is one of the provinces that is withstanding the crisis at a lesser social cost, and the district with the largest number of Centrist members. Of the abundant million Sevillian voters, slightly over 30,000 went to the polls to express their confidence in the candidate who was directly and personally backed by the president.

The abundance of the encouragement ceases to be a preeminent factor when Adolfo Suarez, after his electoral tour, is only capable of gaining 3 percent of the potential votes. Does anyone think, at this stage, that the results would be quite different in Catalonia or the Basque Country, in the event of general elections?

More or less reluctantly, the president has agreed to form a good government, and to leave his Moncloa retreat. However, the opinion of the "status quo" is still declining, and each test of strength is still ending in a resounding defeat. Then what is happening? Purely and simply that the shift has come too late; and we are in a phase of the process wherein the irrevocable requirement for more and more visibility will only serve to illuminate bareness.

Since becoming editor of DIARIO 16, I visit the Congress of Deputies less often; something which, in addition to giving an incentive for my optimistic view of things, has provided me with the proper perspective for making a better calibration of what is afoot in its corridors. The Saturday before last, I devoted a considerable part of the morning to listening to all types of individuals, and was quite surprised at the explicit manner in which the majority of Centrist deputies (including ministers, of course) criticize President Suarez and talk about replacing him. Within just a few months, there has been a change from a widespread tendency to convert the president (more or less enthusiastically) into a fixed element in any football pool, assigned to the limbo of the untouchables, to devoting hours and hours to the overt, harsh discussion of what would be the best way of ousting him from his palace.

Somewhat associated with it, in addition to the series of episodic mistakes and failures, is the withdrawal of the protective umbrella caused by Fernando Abril's departure from the government. I have the impression that the individual concerned himself is self-criticizing his resignation, in view of the fact that neither

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo nor any other distinguished member of the cabinet appears willing to replace him in the task of concentrating on himself the wrath and criticism that will logically rain upon the president for lack of a scapegoat.

Abril belongs to that small group of individuals who are loyal at all costs, and who, although they recognize the serious decline in Adolfo Suarez' public reputation, consider him irreplaceable as a "coordinator" of the different Centrist sectors. At the other extreme there are the UCD deputies who, both jokingly and seriously, quote the slogan "Nona Ines for president" (referring to the feeble deputy, Vilarrino), or, what is the equivalent, "anyone except Suarez."

Between one position and the other, the majority of the parliamentary group is viewing the next electoral horizon with selfish and legitimate anxiety. Over and above the differences when it is time to analyze whether or not the present situation is tolerable until 1983, there is the unanimous opinion that UCD will lose the elections if it runs in them under the leadership of Suarez.

In many instances, this consideration has been made from a viewpoint of admiration and affection for the president. It is claimed that attrition is something inherent in every democratic government task, and Suarez has been in power for 4 and a half years, during a period beset with shocks. In the event that he should survive until 1983, he would be in office for 7 years, and if he were to continue to head UCD in the electoral contest, he would be striving for 4 more years. What kind of reception, what type of popular enthusiasm could be generated among the citizens by an offer based on the notion of "11 years of Suarez"? Even if his performance had been a model of success, it would not be aesthetically presentable for the first constitutional ruler after the endless regime of Franco to enjoy power for so long a time.

Suarez himself should be the first to understand that the Second UCD Congress could not serve a better purpose than that of acting as a framework for the first phase of the political operation aimed at relieving him, with his own consent and acquiescence. In addition to the statutory reforms directed toward democratizing what has been up until now a patrimonial party, for this purpose it would be essential for the president to take advantage of the occasion to announce publicly that he will not be a candidate (at least as first in line) in the next electoral race.

This would be the method that would least risk the continuity of UCD as a party, because it would begin a long period of renovation and internal debate, during which Suarez could continue to head a government which, in fact, would acquire certain aspects of a pre-electoral caretaker cabinet. It would also be an enviably dignified departure for a man of Suarez' age, who could in the future always capitalize on the fact that he had left at the halfway mark on his own initiative.

When matters are viewed with the pragmatism that the situation demands, it all boils down, here and now, to whether or not Landelino Lavilla and Fernandez Ordonez will be capable of arriving at a strategy toward the congress and of keeping their commitments to the end. If Joaquin Garrigues had not died, the pact would have been easier, because it would have had a perfect catalyst. Without that "lost link," there is a serious risk that Ordonez will allow himself to be intoxicated by those in the service of Moncloa who want a mistake made concerning the antagonist, and who want confusion regarding the conflict.

2909

CSO: 3110

POLL SHOWS CONTINUED GAINS FOR SDP; VPK HOLDS POSITION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Dec 80 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The Social Democrats would have regained power if an election had been held in November. That is shown by the party preference poll taken by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The nonsocialist coalition parties would have gotten 43.6 percent of the vote, compared to 54.6 percent for the socialist bloc. The Social Democrats are making strong progress both in the City of Stockholm and in Stockholm County at the expense of the three nonsocialist parties.

For the nonsocialist parties, the party preference poll indicates a decline of between 1.8 and 3.2 percent since the previous poll (in May) and of between 4.7 and 6.1 percent compared to the election results of September 1979.

The socialist bloc shows an increase since May of between 1.4 and 2.9 percent, and its gain since the election in September 1979 totals between 4.7 and 6.2 percent.

The poll included 9,000 eligible voters, about 12 percent of whom did not respond. It was taken during the period between 27 October and 19 November.

An election in November would have given the Center Party 15.6 percent, a drop of between 0.3 and 1.5 percent since May and of between 1.9 and 3.1 percent since the election. Its net loss was to the Conservative Party and the VPK [Left Party Communists].

The Liberal Party would have received 7.2 percent, a decline of between 1.0 and 2.1 percent since May and of between 2.9 and 4 percent since the election. Since the election, the Liberal Party has had a net loss of 1.2 percent to the Social Democrats and of 1.1 percent to the Conservative Party.

The Conservative Party's share of the vote would have been 20.8 percent, unchanged in comparison with May but an increase of between 0.1 and 1.1 percent since the election. The net gain for the Conservatives came from the Center Party (0.4 percent) and the Liberal Party (1.2 percent) and included a loss of 0.4 percent to the Social Democrats.

The Social Democrats would have won 48.9 percent, an increase of between 1.6 and 3.2 percent since May and of between 4.9 and 6.5 percent since the election. The Social

Democrats made net gains of 1.2 percent from the Center Party, 1.2 percent from the Liberal Party, 0.4 percent from the Conservatives, and 0.4 percent from the VPK.

VPK Unchanged

The VPK would have won 5.4 percent if there had been an election in November, and that shows no change from May or in comparison with the election results. The KDS [Christian Democratic Union] was chosen by 1 percent of those answering the survey.

Among young people (18 to 34 years of age), the Center Party and the Liberal Party were shown by the poll to have declined since the poll taken in May. The Liberal Party also declined among voters aged 35 and over.

The Conservative Party shows an unquestionable drop in the 35-39 age group.

The Social Democrats are growing among both young and old voters. The increase is unquestionable in age groups 30-34 and 35-39.

The Center Party's share of women's votes has declined since May, according to the poll. The Liberal Party is declining among both older and younger men, but not among older women.

For the Conservative Party, a drop is noted among older men.

The Center and Liberal parties show a decline in the large urban municipalities, while the Social Democrats show an increase. The Liberal Party is also declining in municipalities with an urban population of between 50 and 89 percent, while the Social Democrats are gaining.

In the Municipality of Stockholm, the Center Party is losing ground compared to last May's poll (from 8 to 7 percent), while the Liberal and Conservative parties have declined respectively from 7 to 6 percent and from 31 to 30 percent.

The Social Democrats are up from 43 to 46 percent, and the VPK is down from 9 to 8 percent.


In Stockholm County, the Center Party is down from 12 to 10 percent, the Liberal Party is up from 6 to 7 percent, and the Conservative Party remains unchanged at 28 percent. The Social Democrats are up from 43 to 46 percent, and the VPK remains unchanged at 7 percent.

In the Four-City Circle, the Social Democrats are up from 53 to 60 percent, while the Liberal Party is down from 6 to 4 percent in Smaland, including the islands.

Farmers

In the rest of West Sweden, the Center Party is down from 22 to 19 percent, the Liberal Party is down from 7 to 5 percent, and the Social Democrats are up from 43 to 46 percent.

In East Central Sweden, the Liberal Party is down, mainly because of its decline in Sodermanland County from 9 to 4 percent.



The diagram shows the movement between parties between the September 1979 election and the public opinion poll taken in November of this year. The figures represent net gains and losses as a percentage of all those responding and indicating which party they chose in 1979 and which party they would vote for in November 1980.

The diagram shows that the Liberal Party lost 1.2 percent to the Social Democrats and 1.1 percent to the Conservatives, who in turn lost 0.4 percent to the Social Democrats.

The Center Party lost 0.4 percent to the Conservatives and 1.2 percent to the Social Democrats, as well as a small number to the VPK. In turn, the VPK lost 0.4 percent to the Social Democrats.

Key:

- | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Left Party Communists | 4. Liberal Party |
| 2. Center Party | 5. Social Democrats |
| 3. Conservative Party | |

The Liberal Party is losing ground among those employed in production and distribution, while the Social Democrats are gaining. The situation is the same among office employees, technicians, and so on. The Liberal Party lost ground in particular among clerks, engineers, and related workers. The drop for the Center Party occurred chiefly among specialists with at least 5 years training.

The increase for the Social Democrats is found chiefly among clerical employees with less than 2 years training and among engineers.

Among farmers with small holdings, the Center Party lost ground, while the Conservatives and Social Democrats gained. A decline for the Center Party is noted among students.

It is estimated that voter turnout would total between 88.9 and 89.5 percent, with the Social Democrats getting the biggest turnout and the Center Party the smallest.

11798

CSO: 3109

RECENT INTERNAL STRUGGLES SHOW CABINET NEAR DISSOLUTION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Dec 80 p 8

[Commentary by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Falldin's three-party nonsocialist government is disintegrating completely following several brilliant displays of internal power struggles. In many respects, this state of things reminds one of the phenomena of weariness that manifested themselves when the first Falldin government broke up over the energy question. But since there is no clear alternative for government, the parties are almost forced to stay together to the bitter end.

In this situation, it is completely clear that Sweden's economic problems cannot be solved with a one-seat majority in Parliament and with three nonsocialist parties openly fighting each other in the newspapers and in their internal power game. Defectors are popping up first here, then there.

Coping with Sweden's economic problems requires a mustering of strength from both blocs, and one task, after that is achieved, will be to put the employee organizations in their place so that they are compelled to cooperate in rebuilding Sweden's economy.

The question today is not so much whether the NCB [Cellulose Company of Norrland Forest Owners] or Vanerskog is going to go bankrupt, but rather whether, figuratively speaking, it is the government that will go bankrupt. The budget deficit is growing constantly. And so is the deficit in foreign trade. Inflation is flourishing more than ever in such an economic climate. And new injustices are being created.

Energy the Mainspring

Something sensible is going to have to happen soon in politics. Instead of simply haggling, the politicians ought to be adopting future-oriented measures that will get the wheels turning again. Energy must be used as a mainspring in society's development--Ullsten is right about that. The more domestic energy sources that can be created, the better. It is remarkable that it is not possible for the government parties to reach agreement on such simple and obvious matters.

On one point there is an essential difference in comparison with 1978, when the first Falldin government fell because of the energy question.

It is this: if the second Falldin government breaks up, there will be no obvious nonsocialist alternative for government.

Difficult Business

In 1970 the Liberal Party stood out as a temporary alternative for government pending the 1979 election. Today a Liberal Party government will not be possible if the three-party coalition comes crashing down. The Social Democrats will not repeat their 1970 achievement of letting Ullsten win by abstaining from the vote on the prime minister.

A Center Party government is not likely, either, and even less probable is a Conservative government. Neither of those solutions would have any prospects of lasting. Breaking up the Falldin government is therefore a difficult business. It would require that at least one of the three opposition (as published) parties feel that it has more to gain by going into the opposition than by remaining in the government until the next election. We have not reached that point today.

The following also applies:

Unable To Form Government

If the nonsocialists prove unable to form a government, which is probable, the job of speaker would be offered to opposition leader Olof Palme. The voting rules are such that the three nonsocialist parties can stop such a government from coming to power.

It goes without saying that the Conservatives would vote against Palme. Do the Liberals have the courage to let a Social Democratic government in by abstaining from the vote, in return for what the Social Democrats did for them?

Very doubtful. Liberal Party members like to keep one eye on the Conservatives. Letting Palme in would be no recommendation as far as the more general range of nonsocialist voters is concerned. The guess is that the Conservatives would reap the benefit.

Big Minus

What would happen if Palme were able to form a government because the Liberal Party and possibly the Center Party abstained from voting?

The first step would be to call a new election. If we are to believe the voter barometer, Palme would then have a chance of winning his own majority.

A new election cannot appear especially tempting either to the Liberal Party or to the Center Party, both of which show a big minus in the voter barometer.

There remains the alternative of a government comprising both blocs and consisting of the Social Democrats, the Center Party, and the Liberal Party.

That is the only rational alternative in today's situation, but unfortunately, it will not be among our political realities for many years to come. Imagining Palme

and Falldin in the same government is like thinking of plague and cholera both arriving at once.

The conclusion is that the three nonsocialist coalition parties are more or less forced to stay together even if the country goes under economically in the process.

With the recent political events fresh in our memories, however, we naturally cannot exclude entirely the possibility of a government crisis through some sort of "occupational accident." The suicide instinct is well developed in government circles.

11798

CSO: 3109

NAVY'S LARGEST RECONNAISSANCE BASE DISBANDED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Nov 80 p 6

[Article by Agneta Lagercrantz]

[Text] At one time the Navy Reconnaissance Base F11, located a few kilometers outside the center of Nykoping, was the country's largest reconnaissance base. Since its disbandment last June the runways have been deserted; they are still left intact as a reserve for foreign flights and are maintained by an eight-man-unit.

Through the 550 employees of the Navy Base 2,000 persons became dependant on the base. At this time the entire military staff has gradually been transferred to other bases. Many still live in Nykoping, but commute to their new workplace, like for example Navy Base F13 in Norrkoping.

Things have been more difficult for the civilian staff of approximately 155 persons. Most of them have found new jobs in the defense department or with the government-- some have found jobs themselves. But 15 persons, mostly women, are still unemployed.

Einar Pettersson, former head of the government employees union at F11, is now packing up the remains together with three others. They are taking care of first aid kits, shiny brass buttons decorated with the state crest, heaps of paper and garbage.

Just Clean-Up

"Basically every building is empty now," says Einar Pettersson. The buildings, that is the barracks, some of them were restored and repaired only 10 years ago, but now there is only one more thing to do with them, and that is to clean them up.

Einar Pettersson used to be in charge of supplies and has been working at F11 since 1963. Now he is cleaning up after 40 years' service on this Navy Base. He will be doing this until the new year, after that he does not know what kind of job he will have. What is his attitude to the disbandment of this base, we ask.

"Do you want to hear it in plain Swedish," he wonders, but cleans up his language as he replies: "I think it's a damn' shame to have a place like this lie waste. We have tried to propose all kinds of suggestions about how to use this place, but nobody has been interested."

'We' refers to the task force (where Einar Pettersson represented the union) that has tried to find employment for the people who are now left without jobs as a result of disbanding this base. Together with representatives for the local government of Nyköping, people from the central Employment Agency, the county's employment agency, the departments of defense and industry he has worked hard in order to get the replacement jobs that were promised by the government as the decision to disband this base was taken in 1975.

Nothing Has Materialized

"As far as I'm concerned, nothing has materialized here in Stockholm. But if our party had remained in power in 1976, I'm sure somebody would have tried harder to keep that promise.

Starting up a fight involving the union over this disbandment has not been discussed. It's not worth it," says Pettersson. "This is a matter of money and cut-backs. Out of a large number of bases that were considered, it just so happened that Kalmar and Nyköping were the ones hit.

"If we had been working for a private company, we could have demanded the company to take on its social responsibility. But when it comes to the military, everything is run on the basis of money allocated by the government.

"But we have one basic demand as far as responsibility is concerned," says Einar Pettersson, "namely that the task force that was formed by the government at least should have been working up until Fil was disbanded.

"As things now stand, it turned out to be a fruitless effort with a sorry ending. When the chairman called a meeting last May, nobody was aware of the fact that the task force had been dissolved already in January. The argument was that the county government was to take over the broad, regional responsibility for this matter. However, no monies have been ear-marked for the purpose of replacing the jobs at Fil.

8901

CSO: 8150/0325

DEFENSE COMMITTEE URGES DISSOLVING ELEVEN REGIMENTS, SCHOOLS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Nov 80 p 6

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] Eleven regiments and schools are to disappear before 1987. This also means that 3,000 employees are to be released during the same time period.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET has learned that a unanimous defense committee is hard at work to implement these goals and make them part of the overall goals of the Department of Defense from 1982 on. This is also the goal of an investigation about Sweden's peace time defense which has been requested from the defense staff and a special group within the Department of Defense.

No matter what economic decisions are taken by this defense committee later on this winter regarding the entire defense, eleven regiments, units, and schools must be dissolved. The committee's proposals will be delivered in February or March.

This means that the defense committee has placed its goals just below middle level the three economic levels investigated by Commander-in-Chief Lennart Ljung. Annual allocations to our military defense in the Commander-in-Chief's proposal is 14,950, 14,350, and 13,000 million kronor. Earlier economic directives from the government allowed a top level of 14,600 million kronor. Today's allocation for the defense, in the same monetary value, is 13,600 million kronor annually.

Organization of the Defense in War Time

The fact that the defense committee is working with lower economic figures for the peace time organization than previously directed by the government is a clear sign that people in the non-socialist block want to put the money reserves into organizing the defense in war time. This means that it will be easier to stop the reduction of sophisticated weapons and materials that has been going on since the beginning of the seventies. A reduced peace time organization is expected to yield two to three billion kronor in today's monetary value up to 1995.

The Social Democrats are expected to be hesitant towards this idea, since their lowest level was requested at 13,000 million kronor. This level is to be investigated further. However, when it comes to the question of peace time organization, they have already moved up their requests considerably, after having seen the results of the investigation done by the Commander-in Chief.

It is common knowledge that members of government from all political parties are strongly in favor producing jobs through the Defense Department in their local constituencies.

Already at this time calls have been made and investigations have been presented by different constituencies that feel affected by these decisions. And during the winter the defense committee will get visits from at least one constituency per week.

These Are the Ones Affected

On the basis of different sources and investigations we now know that I3 in Orebro, I13 in Falun, I17 in Uddevalla, P2 in Hassleholm, A6 in Jonkoping and Lv6 in Goteborg are on the list of possible units to be dissolved within the army.

In the navy the discussion centers around Ka5 in Harnosand, and in the air force it is Fl0 in Angelholm. There are also discussions about moving T2 and K3 in Skovde to Karlsborg, where it would consequently be possible to dissolve S2.

There have also been suggestions to combine I12 and Ing. 2 in Eksjo, and I21 and T3 in Solleftea, and of I4, A1, and T1 in Linkoping, and possibly K1 and I1 in Stockholm. Within the navy Goteborg and Karlskrona might be affected by different plans for combination of units. Within the air force there are discussions under way of combining the schools at Fl4 and Fl8, and locating them either in Halmstad or in Tullinge outside of Stockholm.

These changes are to be completed by 1987. In order for this to be possible a decision must be taken during the winter and the locations must be pointed out in the final report from the defense committee during October-November 1981. The proposal also entails dissolving another five units between 1987 and 1992. In this section there is mention of F6 in Karlsborg, among other units. And further combinations are intended to cut down on administration.

By dissolving these units and by reducing the staff of administrative offices like supplies and fortifications, 5,400 permanent employees would be eliminated by 1992, a reduction of 12 per cent.

A Twenty Percent Reduction

The final result over a twenty-year-period will then be that the defense has been cut by 10,000 positions, from nearly 49,000 employees in 1972 to a little over 38,000 employees in 1992, a reduction of more than 20 per cent. Such a reduction figure is completely unique within the administration of our government.

Dissolving these regiments and schools is made easier by the fact that fewer recruits are to be trained during the late eighties and the early nineties. Today the reduction is estimated at 3,000 to 5,000 recruits per year compared to today's training.

There are reasons to believe that this delicate question in the area of our defense will become a big political issue in 1981. The constituency of Eksjo has already turned in a sizeable investigative report concerning its great need for military jobs. 3,500 persons will be affected by decisions about the two regiments in Eksjo and the tax base from these persons is 16 per cent.

8901

CSO: 8150/0325

TORTURE ACCUSATIONS RECEIVING THOROUGH ATTENTION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Jan 81 p 6

[Text] Since the 12 September coup 22,758 petitions on assorted matters have been submitted to the National Security Council (NSC). Accusations of smuggling, impropriety, and bribery have made up a major portion of the petitions while another group has been composed of accusations of torture.

According to what has been learned, the petitions submitted to the NSC are being examined in a clearly systematic manner. However, no action is being taken on unsigned petitions.

Circles close to the Council explained that the NSC is paying very meticulous attention to accusations of torture in particular. They said in this regard:

"Accusations of torture in Turkey and the world are not new. These accusations have cropped up in every political period of our country. Accusations of torture appeared after 12 September in several foreign press organs and in sensationalist papers."

"Of all the accusations being submitted to the Council, accusations of torture are receiving the most thorough attention. These accusations are being examined and brought to a speedy resolution."

"The most important point is the necessity of reviewing these accusations. If the accusation is true, those responsible for this type of inhumane act will be turned over to the proper judicial authorities."

"The administration is absolutely opposed to this type of treatment and the assault this constitutes on people's right to life and their honor. In this regard, accusations coming particularly from abroad and orchestrated by this country's enemies are deliberate in nature. Their aim is to wear down the Council and foment a return to the previous chaotic environment they long for."

CSO: 4907

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